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Chapter 1
Introduction
Social Policy in Germany faces a multitude of challenges which are mostly induced by
demographic and social-cultural changes of society. This thesis is concerned with the
economic consequences of two current aspects of the changing structure of the German
society. On the one side this relates to the aging of society, and on the other side to
the shifting household composition from ‘classic’ families to single-parent households.
The aging of society directly influences the functioning of the German old-age pen-
sion system as it is primarily based on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. An appro-
priate indicator to unveil the necessity to modify the German pension system in order
to maintain old-age security is the projected evolution of the ratio ‘pensioners to em-
ployees’, the so-called ‘Rentnerquotient’. Whereas in 2007 the ratio amounted to 0.54,
thus about two employees had to finance one pensioner, Börsch-Supan and Wilke
(2007) predict a ratio ranging between 0.70 and 0.95 for the year 2030.1 Hence, in the
worst case scenario one employee has to finance almost one pensioner.
The changes in the family structure pose challenges in so far as empirical investiga-
tions reveal that single-parent households have a significant higher probability of being
poor than ‘classic’ families (see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 2008; Grabka and
Frick, 2010). Figures of the German Federal Statistical Office (2010) reveal
that single-parent households are firmly established in the German society. Moreover,
their share in households with children is continuously increasing. Whereas in 1996
about 14% of the households with children were single-parent households, this share
has risen steadily to 19% in 2009. Hence, against the background of the increasing
share of separated family forms, and concerning the fact that this group is prevalently
threatened by poverty, it should be examined whether the current tax-benefit system is
organized appropriately in order to treat those persons fairly. From a methodological
point of view the thesis provides empirical investigations that are based on the analysis
of survey and simulated data.
1The predicted ratio depends on different demographic scenarios. For further information see Börsch-
Supan and Wilke (2007).
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Part I of the thesis relates to two different aspects of the impact of the aging of
society on old-age security. As already mentioned above, the German old-age pension
system is primarily based on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, thus population aging
has caused and will cause fiscal imbalances threatening the financial situation of the
elderly. Hence, the matter of old-age security has gained more and more attention. This
becomes obvious when considering the multitude of reforms that have been undertaken
in the last decade, in order to maintain old-age security in Germany. Those reforms
will affect both income level as well as income composition of the elderly. As an
example, the rise in retirement age and the introduction of the ‘factor of sustainability’2
may lower the relative importance of payments from statutory pensions, whereas the
importance of income from employment will rise. At the same time, it is to be expected
that the relative importance of capital income will rise as well, since politicians intend
to strengthen self-reliance for old-age income by implementing subsidies for private
provision (e.g. ‘Riester’ and ‘Rürup’ pension schemes). Thereby individuals, even
though belonging to the same age cohort, will react in different ways.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we analyze the evolution of the financial situation, the
changes in income composition as well as the evolution of income distribution of the
elderly. In doing so, we are allowed to reveal the impact of different income components
on inequality. Subsequently, we are able to deduce possible inequality trends for the
previous years.
Although both chapters are similar from a methodological point of view, they differ
in the data used. Whereas we use the German Sample Survey of Income and Ex-
penditure (EVS) in Chapter 2 and cover the period 1978–2003, we use the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) in Chapter 3 and analyze the period since the German
reunification. Hence, the examination of both datasets enables us to analyze a wide
period, reaching from the late 70s up to current years. In so far, Chapter 2 and 3
can be regarded as current completion of previous works on the income distribution
of the elderly in Germany (see Biewen, 2004; Börsch-Supan et al., 2001; Mün-
nich, 2001; Schwarze and Frick, 2000). We focus our investigation on persons that
are 55 years and older and provide their price-adjusted annual pre-tax-post-transfer
equivalent incomes. Throughout the examination we distinguish between elderly form
the Old and New Federal States, and additionally, between elderly drawing their main
income from retirement or employment, respectively. We use the Gini index as measure
of inequality since it is additively decomposable into single income components. With
the Gini elasticity we are able to quantify the impact of changes of the relative share
of single income components on inequality (see Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985; Rao,
2The ‘factor of sustainability’ (Nachhaltigkeitsfaktor) was introduced by the ‘Pension Scheme Sustain-
ability Law’ (RV Nachhaltigkeitsgesetz ) of 2004 and came into effect in 2005. It is a mathematical
term that was incorporated in the pension formula in order to account for the increasing relation of
pensioners to employees. In the long-term the introduction will lower replacement rates by about 15
percentage points (see Grimm, 2005).
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1969). In doing so, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first who apply this method
in order to analyze the income distribution of the elderly in Germany. Furthermore,
we test the statistical significance of our results with the bootstrap method.
As mentioned above, reforms will cause a shift of old-age provision from the public to
the private sector. In Chapter 4 it is examined, whether the German market for private
old-age provision is organized efficiently. Thereby, we focus on market failure caused
by adverse selection in the private pension insurance market. Adverse selection in the
market for private old-age provision is a concern, since premiums rise and eventually
become prohibitively high for low-risk individuals who are pushed out of the market.
Methodologically, we use the 2005 wave of the survey data on Savings Behavior
and Old-Age Provision in Germany (SAVE) and estimate a probit model of insurance
holdings. Referring to the research question, subjective life-expectancy is the core
determinant in investigating the uptake of private old-age insurance. Furthermore, the
selected estimation model allows us to determine further determinants for the uptake.
Following the theory of Yaari (1965) we additionally take into consideration time
and risk preferences. Furthermore, we contribute to the discussion on the low uptake
of annuities, the ‘annuity puzzle’, by taking into account further determinants like
substitutive old-age provision from the public pension system, financial literacy and
socio-economic characteristics.3
Referring to the applicability of the results, Chapter 4 gives deeper insights into
the functioning of the market for private pension insurance. This knowledge facilitates
to provide a more efficient configuration of the market and helps to direct incentives
to those persons, which under current terms, are less willing to make provisions for
old-age.
Part II of the thesis is dedicated to the economic consequences of the changing
family structure from ‘classic’ families to single-parent households. Whereas a wide
body of literature is concerned with the gender-specific changes in well-being after
marital dissolution (see e.g. Burkhauser et al., 1991; Gadalla, 2009; Holden
and Smock, 1991; McKeever and Wolfinger, 2001), this work aims at analyzing
the distributive justice between the divorced or legally separated parents. To the best
of our knowledge, the study presented in Chapter 5 is the first, which investigates the
question of distributive justice between formerly related or married by revealing the
equity perceptions that are inherent in the prevailing tax-benefit system.4
From a methodological point of view, we generate an artificial dataset that com-
prises various combinations of separately living families. That means, in each case
of a separated family we consider a single household of the non-custodial parent and
3For further literature on the discussion on the ‘annuity puzzle’ see e.g. Brown et al. (2008a);
Inkmann et al. (2011) or more detailed Sections 4.2 and 4.4.
4This methodology has been predominantly used with respect to analyze the distributive justice
inherent in tax-benefit without taking into consideration the support legislation, see e.g. Bönke and
Eichfelder (2010); Muellbauer and Ven (2002, 2004).
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an associated single-parent household of the custodial parent, which comprises one to
three dependent children. Our analysis is done for varying annual gross incomes of
both households. Thereby we assume that the non-custodial parent draws an income
at least as high as that of the custodial parent. Hence, starting-point of the analysis
is the pre-tax-pre-transfer income of both considered households. Income undergoes a
simulation model of the German tax-benefit system, including the tax legislation, con-
tributions to social security, public transfers in form of the unemployment benefit II
and private transfers in form of support payments. Referring to the support payments
we consider two scenarios, the non-custodial parent is liable for (a) ‘child support only’
or (b) ‘child and spousal support’. Finally, we obtain the disposable incomes of the
concerned households.
We analyze the equity perceptions by means of equivalence scales which are em-
ployed in two different applications. On the one side, we reverse the commonly applied
equivalence scale methodology by assuming that horizontal equity is satisfied by the
German tax-benefit system. Hence, we investigate the equity perceptions by means of
implicit equivalence scales that are inherent in the interplay of the comprehensive tax-
benefit system. Finally, the derived implicit equivalence scales provide those relations
of disposable incomes that ensure equal living standards for both parents. On the other
side, we employ equivalence scales in order to provide distributive justice in a more ‘ap-
plied’ manner. We investigate to what extent the actual support payments differ from
those payments that would be ‘recommended’ by commonly used equivalence scales.
Besides its contribution to the political debate on distributive justice, Chapter 5
contributes to the economic literature by applying the framework of implicit equivalence
scales to the context of support payments. Additionally, Chapter 5 is engaged in the
discussion on an appropriate design of equivalence scales.5
5For a further discussion on the design of equivalent scales see e.g. Muellbauer and Ven (2002).
Part I: Old-Age Security
Chapter 2
Incomes and Inequality in the Long
Run: The Case of German Elderly1
2.1 Introduction
This study investigates the long-run changes in the income distribution for the elderly
in Germany, defined as persons age 55 and older. Amongst other reasons, this era
is interesting as several fundamental reforms of the statutory German pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) pension system have been undertaken. Indeed, in the late 1970s, the
German PAYG system was expanded to one of the World’s most generous ones, both in
terms of replacement rates and early retirement provisions. Population ageing, German
reunification and high unemployment rates, however, caused a raising fiscal imbalance.
Policy makers reacted. The eligibility age has been raised, replacement rates have been
lowered, and subsidies have been introduced to stimulate private old-age provisions.2
The reforms undertaken and in preparation have direct implications for the financial
situation of Germany’s actual and future elderly. They also change the legal framework
under which individual labour supply, retirement, savings or fertility decisions are
made (see e.g. Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003; Börsch-Supan et al., 2003;
Frommert and Heien, 2006; Hirte, 2002; Schnabel, 1999; Siddiqui, 1997).
Taking stock of the changes in the income distribution of the elderly in the last
decades can provide a useful yardstick for taxing the costs and benefits of the ongoing
reform process. Already, several empirical studies have provided information on the
shape of the income distribution for the elderly, including Biewen (2004); Börsch-
Supan et al. (2001); Münnich (2001); Schwarze and Frick (2000) and others.
This study builds on this literature, extending information along two dimensions.
First, we seek to investigate, in detail, the financial situation of elderly persons and
its intertemporal evolution. Throughout the period under consideration, we provide
1The chapter is a slightly modified version of Bönke et al. (2010).
2An overview of the 12 major reforms between 1977 and 2003 can be found in Appendix A, Table A.3.
6
2.1 Introduction 7
price-adjusted annual pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent incomes and factor shares, the
percentage shares of different income components in elderly households’ budgets. Sec-
ond, we examine the intertemporal evolution of income inequality, measured by the
Gini index, and how changes in factor shares and income components’ distributions
contribute to overall inequality. Whereas most previous literature lacks information on
statistical inference, we use the bootstrap method to test for statistical significance of
the results. By means of the Gini elasticity, we further assess the impact of a marginal
equiproportionate change in income from a specific component on overall inequality
(see Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985; Rao, 1969). Such estimates are of particular inter-
est for policy-makers who are concerned about the relationship between policy-driven
changes of peoples’ budgets and the income distribution. All results are provided for
four subpopulations of elderly people. Two criteria define these subpopulations: region
of residence (New vs. Old German Federal States, or ’Laender’) and (non)receipt of
an old-age PAYG or civil servant pension. The database underlying our calculations
are six cross-sections of the German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure (EVS),
harmonized in an intertemporally consistent manner.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
database and describes its processing. Section 2.3 explains inequality measures, the
bootstrap method and statistical test procedures employed. Empirical results are pro-
vided in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Construction of the Database
Our study is based on six EVS cross-sections, collected between 1978 and 2003. The
EVS is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office, conducted at five-year in-
tervals, and contains representative household income, wealth and consumption data.3
Cross-section size ranges between 40,000 and 60,000 household units. Persons living in
communal establishments and institutions, and households exceeding a specific income
cut-off are not included.4
From each cross-section, only persons of age 55 and older enter our database. A mi-
nority of elderly subjects is not considered as a result of two technical reasons. First,
intrafamiliar relationships remain unclear in some cases. This especially applies to
households with three or more elderly persons. Second, income components sometimes
cannot be assigned to the household members without extra assumptions. To reduce
resulting inaccuracies, only the first two elderly persons from every EVS household
unit are included in the database.5 The eliminated fraction of elderly persons is small,
for example 4.3% in 2003. Another concern is over- and undersampling. Compared
with the German micro-census, the EVS oversamples people in their 70s on the ac-
count of subjects age 80 and older. To fit the German microcensus statistics, we have
adjusted EVS sample weights according to the entropy-based minimum information
loss principle.6
Income reported throughout this paper is annual pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent
income expressed in year 2003 prices,7 comprising (a) employment income: earned
income and self-employed income; (b) retirement income: retirement pensions from
public pension fund, civil servant’s pensions, company pensions, and other pensions;
(c) transfer income: benefits related to former employment, social assistance, family-
related benefits and other transfers; (d) investment income; and (e) other income.8
Other income is a residual that cannot unambiguously be assigned to the previous four
income components. Pre-tax-post-transfer income is the sum of all individual incomes
3For further information, see German Federal Statistical Office (2005).
4According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2005), the number of top-income house-
holds participating in the EVS is not sufficient to provide reliable information. Monthly household
disposable income cut-offs (in prices of 2003) are as follows: 18,811e in 1978; 18,546e in 1983;
17,497e in 1988; 20,788e in 1993; 19,131e in 1998; 18,000e in 2003.
5Within the questionnaire of the EVS, each household can chose the ranking of the household members
on its own. This applies to all household members except for the first person in the household, which
has to be the head of the household. However, for the EVS this does not automatically mean that
this person is the main earner. From every household we keep the first two persons of age 55 years
and older in our dataset. Hence, we cannot give generalities on the position or function of the elderly
which comprise our households. Our decision to keep the first two persons of age 55 years and older
is driven by the assumption that households rank their members according to their contributions to
household income.
6Details on the reweighting procedure are outlined in Appendix A.
7Incomes have been adjusted using consumer prices, employed consumer price indices (CPI) are pro-
vided in Appendix A, Table A.1.
8The income components are constructed from several EVS variables. See Appendix A, Table A.2 for
details.
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of elderly persons living in a household unit plus a fraction of incomes reported at
the household level only, with individual incomes of other household members being
ignored. The fraction is given by the number of elderly persons divided by the number
of all persons in the original household unit. Finally, to make incomes of elderly
household units with one member and two members comparable, pre-tax-post-transfer
incomes are equalized using the OECD-modified equivalence scale.9 The resulting pre-
tax-post-transfer equivalent income is assigned to each elderly person in the household
unit.10
9The OECD-modified equivalence scale assigns a value of 1.0 to the one-member household, an incre-
ment of 0.5 to each additional adult household member. See OECD (2009) for details.
10The suitability of different income concepts from a welfare perspective is discussed in Podder and
Chatterjee (2002). Benefits and strengths of our income concept are discussed in Appendix A.
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2.3 Methodological Considerations
2.3.1 Measurement of Inequality
Inequality estimates provided throughout this paper consider sampling weights. Hence,
if an elderly person lives in a household unit with a sampling weight of 50, in all
calculations this observation is considered 50 times. Our inequality measure is the
Gini index, G, twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the equality line. The
Gini index gives a relative small weight to ’outliers’, i.e. very high incomes, so that
biases in the inequality estimates driven by top coding should be small. The Gini
index is additively decomposable by income components (see Lerman and Yitzhaki,
1985; Rao, 1969).11 Such a decomposition is of interest as previous and future pension
reforms most likely will alter the composition of elderly peoples’ budgets.
To better understand the role that changes in factor shares of different income
components i (i = 1, . . . , I) have for inequality, Gini elasticities are provided. The
Gini elasticity of i, ηi, gives the percentage change in the Gini index with respect to
an equiproportionate marginal change in equivalent income of i. It is defined as
ηi =
∂G
∂µi
µi
G
=
1
G
[
µi
µ
(Ci −G)
]
with
I∑
i=1
ηi = 0 (2.1)
where µ is mean equivalent income, µi is mean equivalent income of income component i
and Ci is the respective concentration coefficient. If the elasticity is negative (positive),
an increase in mean equivalent income of i reduces (increases) inequality. From (2.1)
it can be seen that an income component affects the Gini index through two different
channels: (a) through its relative share in total equivalent income, wi = µiµ ; and (b)
through its spread over the range of total equivalent income, Ci. Let ∆Gi = Gt−Gt−x
denote the difference in Gini indices for periods t and t − x, and let wi and Ci be
functions of time, then
∆Gt ≈
I∑
i=1
(
Ci,t + Ci,t−x
2
)
∆wi,t +
I∑
i=1
(
wi,t + wi,t−x
2
)
∆Ci,t (2.2)
for discrete periods.12 The sum
∑I
i=1
(
Ci,t+Ci,t−x
2
)
∆wi,t is the change of the Gini index
as a result of changes in the shares of different income components in total equiva-
lent income, the share effect. The second term,
∑I
i=1
(wi,t+wi,t−x
2
)
∆Ci,t, quantifies the
impact of changes in concentration coefficients on overall inequality, the concentration
effect (see Podder and Chatterjee, 2002).
11Our presentation is a brief summary of the analysis outlined in Podder (1993); Podder and
Chatterjee (2002), where further details are provided.
12Podder and Chatterjee (2002, p. 8) have suggested an averaging of the two periods’ estimates
as a ’compromise - and for a better approximation’, as changes can be measured both with respect
to period t and t− x.
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2.3.2 Bootstrap Inference and Inequality
To test for statistical significance of results, we compute standard errors and confi-
dence intervals using the bootstrap method (see Mills and Zandvakili, 1997). From
each cross-section of elderly people, we draw, with replacement, 100 random samples.13
Each random sample has as many sampling units as the original cross-section, and each
sampling unit in the original cross-section has the same probability of being selected.
Hence, the bootstrap does not account for differences in sampling weights. Sampling
weights, however, are accounted for whenever an income or inequality measure is com-
puted, be it for the calculation of point estimates from the original database or for
the calculation of standard errors and confidence intervals from bootstrap samples (see
Biewen, 2002).14
Our particular interest is the assessment of statistical significance of intertem-
poral changes. The test procedure is illustrated by means of the Gini index, but
applies analogously to other measures derived in the empirical part of this paper.
Per cross-section, we compute 100 values of the Gini index, one per random boot-
strap sample. This gives 100 Gini differences for each two consecutive cross-sections,
∆G∗bt = G
∗b
t − G∗bt−5, where b = 1, . . . , 100. The difference in the Gini point estimates
derived from the original EVS database is ∆Gˆt = Gˆt − Gˆt−5. Hence, suppressing the
period subscripts, Hall (1994) percentile confidence interval for the Gini difference is
Pr(2∆Gˆ − ∆G∗high ≤ ∆G ≤ 2∆Gˆ − ∆G∗low) = (100−2α)100 . The estimate ∆G∗high is the
2.5th upper and ∆G∗low is the 2.5th lower percentile in the bootstrap distribution of
differences and ∆G is the true difference. The change in the Gini index is statistically
significant if the Hall confidence interval does not include zero (see Athanasopoulos
and Vahid, 2003).
The statistical significance of differences within a cross-section, for example in Gini
indices for pensioners and non-pensioners, can be assessed through examining overlaps
of confidence intervals for group-specific estimates.15
Our bootstrap approach does not account for the fact that the EVS is a stratified
sample. In case of stratification, sampling units are selected from the overall population
according to household characteristics. Typically, population units belonging to a
stratum consisting of many observations have a smaller probability of being included
13It has to be criticized that the chosen number of 100 repetitions is not large enough to yield a confi-
dence interval that is close to the ideal bootstrap confidence interval (seeAndrews and Buchinsky,
2002). In our follow-up analysis, which can be found in Chapter 3, we therefore decided to apply a
number of 1000 repetitions.
14A technical equivalent analysis with two cross-sections of Australian Household Expenditure Survey
(AHES) data is conducted by Athanasopoulos and Vahid (2003). Like the EVS, the AHES is a
representative cross-sectional database derived from stratified multistage probability sampling.
15It has to be mentioned that the applied method to test the statistical significance of differences of the
bootstrap distribution, by examining overlaps of confidence intervals for group-specific estimates,
yields a higher power than the assigned 5 percent level of significance. Hence, the conducted test is
stricter than required. An examination of the bootstrap distribution of the mean differences would
be more appropriate.
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in the original database than units belonging to another stratum with few observations.
Then the selected sample is not a random sample. To account for this feature of our
database, bootstrap samples alternatively could be drawn independently within each
stratum and then be merged. Unfortunately, the EVS does not contain a variable
indicating the strata associated with sample points. The EVS stratification variables,
however, are documented (seeGerman Federal Statistical Office, 2005): region
of residence, household type, social situation of the household head and net income
class. Using the stratification variables, we have identified the stratum to which each
sample point belongs to.16 Drawing bootstrap samples independently within each
stratum does not change our conclusions, and so we refrain from reporting results from
the second and focus on the estimates of the first bootstrap approach.17
16As an example, this gives 3,060 strata for year 2003. The German Federal Statistical Office merges
neighbouring strata if sample size in a stratum is small. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge,
a guideline on the merging procedure for neighbouring strata is publicly not available. Hence, our
stratification can only be seen as an approximation.
17Athanasopoulos and Vahid (2003) come to similar conclusions. Estimates are summarized in
Appendix A, Tables A.4–A.9.
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2.4 Empirical Results
The empirical results are edited in two parts. First, we show how the financial situation
of the elderly, measured by equivalent incomes and compositions of household budgets,
has changed over time. The second part deals with the issue of income inequality.
Results are tested for statistical significance, and provided for four different subsam-
ples of the elderly population. For grouping individuals, two partitioning criteria are
applied: region of residence (New vs. Old German Federal States) and the receipt or
non-receipt of an old-age PAYG or civil servant pension. If an elderly person draws a
’classic’ old-age pension (in form of a PAYG or civil servant’s pension), she is assigned
to the subsample of pensioners, else to the non-pensioners.18 This distinction does not
mean that retirement income of non-pensioners is zero. Besides old-age PAYG or civil
servant pensions, retirement income also includes company pensions and pensions due
to special regulations (i.e. compensations and assistance for war victims, survivors’
pensions and pensions due to early retirement).
Table 2.1: Unweighted number of household units (EVS)
Pensioners Non-pensioners
Year Total Sample Size OL NL OL NL
2003 17,104 10,054 2,596 3,581 873
1998 18,643 10,232 3,272 4,150 989
1993 15,334 9,019 1,990 3,150 1,175
1988 16,498 12,408 4,090
1983 16,349 11,950 4,399
1978 19,277 14,532 4,745
Note: Unweighted number of household units with elderly members.
Source: German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures (1978–2003).
Unweighted numbers of observations by subsample are provided in Table 2.1. The
unweighted total number of household observations ranges between 15,334 and 19,277
per cross-section. Smallest is the group of non-pensioners resident in the New Laender
(NL) in 2003, i.e. 873 observations.
2.4.1 The Financial Situation of Elderly People
The intertemporal evolution of mean pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent incomes is sum-
marized in Figure 2.1. The left-hand graph refers to pensioners; the right-hand graph
to non-pensioners. Dark dashed lines connect point estimates of average CPI-adjusted
18Of course, several other options for differentiation exist, such as labour market withdrawal, lack
of earnings, receipt of retirement incomes and age. The empirical implications are discussed in
Smeeding (1990). For Germany, see also Münnich (2001) and Münnich and Illgen (2000).
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of mean equivalent income (EVS)
equivalent incomes for elderly persons resident in the Old Laender (OL), whereas light
dashed lines connect the respective numbers for people living in the NL. Vertical bars
indicate 95% Hall confidence intervals given by (2µˆ − µ∗high, 2µˆ − µ∗low), where µˆ is
the point estimate of average equivalent income, µ∗high is the 2.5th upper and µ∗low is
the 2.5th lower percentile of the bootstrap distribution. Test statistics on the sta-
tistical significance of intertemporal equivalent income changes are provided in Table
2.2. More precisely, Table 2.2 provides the pair-wise differences in point estimates of
annual average equivalent incomes for periods t and t − 5, ∆µˆ, together with Hall
confidence intervals of differences, (2µˆ−µ∗high, 2µˆ−µ∗low). An asterisk indicates that an
intertemporal change between two consecutive periods is significant at the 5% level.
For pensioners, Figure 2.1 in combination with Table 2.2 indicates a substantial and
significant improvement of the financial situation in both parts of Germany. In the OL,
average CPI-adjusted equivalent income grew by 42.56% (17.51%) from 1978 to 2003
(1993 to 2003). Moreover, income growth rates were rather stable, about 8% over a
five-years period, except between 1978 and 1983 when it was lower. In the NL, incomes
grew even faster, 41.37% from 1993 to 2003, indicating a substantial catch-up process.
However, still in year 2003, the regional divide in equivalent incomes is substantial:
annual equivalent income for pensioners in the OL is about 5,714e higher.
Also non-pensioners experienced significant income growth, yet at lower rates:
24.78% (7.62%) from 1978 (1993) to 2003 in the OL compared with 21.40% from
1993 to 2003 in the NL. Moreover, the growth path is more volatile. Indeed, it tends
to mimic the German business cycle.19 In this sense, the German pension system can
be seen as an insurance device against cyclical income variations. Another point is
remarkable. Like their counterparts in the OL, incomes of NL non-pensioners stagnate
between 1998 and 2003, and the income divide between the regions remains fairly high,
amounting to 15,423e in year 2003.
19For longitudinal data on the German business cycle see Buch et al. (2004).
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The previous paragraph concluded that all four subsamples experienced significant
income growth, but at rather different rates. We proceed by complementary evidence on
the composition of elderly peoples’ budgets. In Figure 2.2, four graphs are provided,
one for each subsample. Within each graph, lines connect point estimates of factor
shares for subsequent periods. Vertical bars indicate 95% Hall confidence intervals of
factor shares. Tests of statistical significance of intertemporal change in the shares
are provided in Table 2.3. Here, point estimates of pair-wise differences between the
factor shares of periods t and t − 5, ∆wˆi, and Hall confidence intervals derived from
the bootstrap samples are provided.
We comment on pensioners first. The most important income source for pensioners
is retirement income. It never accounts for less then 60% of all income in the OL, and
always around 80% in the NL. In the OL, the share of investment income significantly
increased until year 1998 at the expense of the retirement income factor share. From
1998 to 2003 the picture reverts, so that OL pensioners’ factor shares all in all changed
only little. Factor shares in the NL are more volatile. Although changes tend to miti-
gate one another over time, the figures indicate increasing factor shares of investment
and other income to the account of retirement and employment income.
For non-pensioners, incomes from employment make up most of their budget:
around 70-80% in the OL compared with around 50-60% in the NL. In the OL, the
share has significantly decreased during the observation period, especially in the 1990s.
There is no specific single income component compensating for this loss. Most robust
is the upwards trend in the share of investment income until 1998. In the NL, most
remarkable is the sharp decline in the share of retirement incomes between 1993 and
1998 in combination with an increasing share of transfer income. Indeed, surging un-
employment rates in the NL since reunification prompted the government back then
to introduce special early retirement regulations of limited duration (i.e. ’Altersüber-
gangsgeld’ and ’Altersteilzeit’) for people age 55 and older. This explains the high
factor share of retirement income for NL non-pensioners in 1993. These regulations
eventually phased out and many elderly started receiving ’classic’ old-age pension in
later years, contributing to the declining factor share of retirement income for NL non-
pensioners between 1993 and 1998. The rising share of transfer income between 1993
and 1998 and the decline in the share of employment income between 1998 and 2003
reflect the rise in unemployment rates in Germany’s newly formed Laender.
2.4.2 Income Inequality
The results from the previous section indicate a substantial financial improvement for
an average elderly person over the last decades. Yet, is it the case that incomes grew
equally fast at the bottom, in the middle or at the top of the income distribution?
We start off looking at the issue of income inequality by means of the Gini index. As
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a relative index, it remains invariant under equiproportionate variation in income, it
increases under variations in favour of the ’rich’ and it decreases under variations in
favor of the ’poor’.
Point estimates of Gini indices and Hall confidence intervals, (2Gˆ−G∗high, 2Gˆ−G∗low),
are provided in Figure 2.3. Different bar widths are chosen to ensure that confidence
intervals are visually distinguishable.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of income inequality (EVS)
Gini indices for the OL indicate little change in inequality levels for pensioners
and non-pensioners from 1978 onwards. For pensioners, the index slightly drops by
2 percentage points from 29.89% in 1978 to 27.89% in 2003. For non-pensioners, the
index increased by less then 1 percentage point from 33.07% in 1978 to 34.01% in
2003. In the NL, the picture differs: Gini indices increased considerably between 1993
and 1998. However, inequality at the start of the 1990s was fairly low: in 1993 the
Gini index for pensioners was 16.56%, echoing a flat income distribution in the former
German Democratic Republic. For non-pensioners, it is 26.51% in 1993 compared
with 31.78% in 2003. Indeed, overlaps of confidence intervals indicate convergence of
inequality levels for non-pensioners across the two regions. As opposed to this, for
pensioners the inequality divide between the two regions remains substantial. In 2003,
Gini indices still differ by more than 8.5 percentage points (OL: 27.89%; NL: 19.16%).
The test statistics for pair-wise differences in Gini indices for consecutive observa-
tion periods in Table 2.4 corroborate the descriptive picture. Table 2.4 summarizes
differences in Gini point estimates for consecutive periods, ∆Gˆ, together with Hall
confidence intervals of these differences. We first comment on the results for the OL.
Concerning pensioners, our tests indicate a significant decline of the Gini index for the
period 1978–1988. From then onwards, differences are insignificant. The distribution
of non-pensioners’ incomes exhibits more variation. The Gini index rises significantly
from 1983 to 1988 and from 1998 to 2003, before falling significantly between 1988 and
1993. Moreover, intertemporal differences in Gini indices are quantitatively larger. For
the NL, test statistics reveal a sharp and significant rise in inequality from 1993 to 1998,
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and stagnation since then. This is equally true for both pensioners and non-pensioners.
We can conclude from the above results that inequality changed rather little during
the observation period in the OL, but that it increased rapidly from 1993 to 1998 in the
NL. As a result, for non-pensioners, our findings indicate a convergence of inequality
levels in the OL and NL.
For better understanding group-specific inequality trends, we proceed with a break-
down of income inequality by income components. More precisely, Figure 2.4 depicts
point estimates of concentration coefficients together with confidence intervals (indi-
cated by vertical bars) at different points in time. Again, differences in bar width are
chosen to offset Hall confidence intervals visually. As a bivariate inequality measure,
the concentration coefficient of i gives the inequality in i related to a household ranking
by pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent income. We find similar results for all four subsam-
ples. Concentration coefficients for employment income, investment income and other
incomes are positive, and hence distributed in favour of elderly persons belonging to
the upper part of the income distribution. By contrast, negative concentration indices
for transfer and retirement income reveal that both are distributed in favour of elderly
people with low pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent income.
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Tests for statistical significance of intertemporal changes in concentration coeffi-
cients are provided in Table 2.5. For OL pensioners, estimates from 1978 to 1993
indicate a decline in concentration coefficients: out of nine significant changes, seven
have a negative sign. On the contrary, between 1993 and 2003 four out of five signif-
icant changes are positive. The aggregate effect of these intertemporal changes is the
concentration effect, which can be taken from Table 2.6. Indeed, for OL pensioners
this effect is significantly different from zero and negative between 1978 and 1988, and
positive when comparing 1998 and 2003. For OL non-pensioners, rising concentration
coefficients of retirement and investment income (employment and retirement income)
lead to positive concentration effects between 1978 and 1983 (1998 and 2003). A sig-
nificant decrease of the concentration coefficient for transfer incomes between 1983 and
1988 goes hand in hand with a negative concentration effect for the same period.
For the NL, there is no obvious pattern. Only one concentration effect out of four
is significant (pensioners, comparison 1998 and 2003). For this reason, it must be
changes in the income composition that have induced the steep inequality increase in
the NL. Indeed, point estimates and confidence intervals of share effects summarized in
Table 2.6 support this conclusion. For 1993 and 1998, share effects are significant and
positive for NL households, particularly for non-pensioners. As opposed to this, share
effects in the OL are typically insignificant or tend to mitigate concentration effects,
so that no significant change in the Gini index is observed.
We conclude the empirical analysis with a summary of Gini elasticities. All Gini
elasticities reported in Table 2.7 are point estimates (in %), ηˆi, together with cor-
responding Hall confidence intervals. The interpretation of the reported numbers is
straightforward. For example, the entry ’0.0728’ means that a 1% increase in employ-
ment income will lead to an 0.0728% increase of the Gini coefficient. Gini elasticities
help answering the following type of question: Let there be an equiproportionate rise
of retirement incomes, what will be the effect on the Gini index? As such information
is particularly useful for evaluating recent policies we restrict attention to the most
recent observation period.
For pensioners from both regions, an increase in retirement income causes the
strongest decrease of the Gini index. A rise of transfer income lowers inequality only
amongst OL pensioners. However, the effect is quantitatively small. It is insignificant
in the NL. In both regions, elasticities for employment income, and followed by in-
vestment and other income are positive. It is interesting to note that elasticities, in
absolute terms, are higher in the NL (except for transfer income).
For non-pensioners, changes in employment and transfer income have the strongest
and opposed effects on inequality: while a rise in employment income is inequality
augmenting, the opposite applies to transfer income. Elasticities of retirement and
investment income are not significantly different from zero, whereas for other income
it is positive.
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Table 2.7: Gini elasticities in year 2003 (EVS)
OL NL
Pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.0728* 0.1480*
(95% CI) (0.0622; 0.0841) (0.1167; 0.1797)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.1923* -0.3361*
(95% CI) (-0.2074; -0.1799) (-0.3691; -0.3004)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0114* 0.0062
(95% CI) (-0.0141; -0.0073) (-0.0299; 0.0308)
Investments
ηˆ4 0.0662* 0.1025*
(95% CI) (0.0535; 0.0795) (0.0858; 0.1169)
Other
ηˆ5 0.0646* 0.0794*
(95% CI) (0.0545; 0.0760) (0.0463; 0.1007)
Non-pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.1213* 0.2292*
(95% CI) (0.1016; 0.1449) (0.1677; 0.2704)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.0345* 0.0034
(95% CI) (-0.0522; -0.0208) (-0.0172; 0.0330)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0956* -0.2751*
(95% CI) (-0.1002; -0.0853) (-0.3099; -0.2362)
Investments
ηˆ4 -0.0185* -0.0088
(95% CI) (-0.0303; -0.0081) (-0.0266; 0.0040)
Other
ηˆ5 0.0272* 0.0514*
(95% CI) (0.0109; 0.0374) (0.0216; 0.0834)
Note: ηˆi denotes the observed Gini elasticity of income component i. CI denotes Hall’ s
confidence interval. *Elasticity is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Source: German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures (2003).
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied intertemporal changes in the income distribution of
Germany’s elderly between 1978 and 2003. The elderly population, defined as people
of age 55 and older, has been decomposed by residence (Old vs. New Federal States),
and we have also distinguished elderly persons receiving an old-age PAYG or civil
servant pensions (pensioners) and elderly persons who do not (non-pensioners). By
means of price-adjusted pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent income and factor shares we
have described changes in the financial situation of elderly people. Gini indices and
further complementing information, particularly concentration coefficients and Gini
elasticities for different income components, have been provided to shed light on extent
and driving sources of inequality. To establish statistical significance of results, we have
estimated standard errors and Hall confidence intervals using the bootstrap method.
Our findings build on six cross-sections of the EVS.
During the observation period, the financial situation of elderly people improved
significantly. Particularly, this applies to pensioners in the NL. Nevertheless, annual
average pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent income in the NL remains significantly below
the OL level. On an annual basis, in year 2003 the difference amounts to about 5,700e
for pensioners and 15,400e for non-pensioners. It can also be shown that income
growth rates are less volatile and higher for pensioners compared to non-pensioners. In
this sense, the German pension system is an effective insurance device against aggregate
GDP shocks.
Concerning the issue of income inequality, we find that the income distribution of
the elderly in the OL is both rather stable and flat. For pensioners, we find a slight but
significant decline of the Gini index in the first half of the observation period and stag-
nation since then. For non-pensioners, there is more variability in Gini indices between
consecutive periods. However, due to opposing signs of intertemporal differences, Gini
point estimates for 1978 and 2003 differ by less than one percentage point. In the
NL, inequality from 1993 to 1998 surged rapidly. As a result, by 2003 the observed
divide in inequality levels between non-pensioners in east and west almost vanished.
For pensioners, the divide remains, with inequality being lower among NL pensioners.
Recent reforms of the German pension system include a paradigm shift towards a
more funded pension scheme. Moreover, retirement age has been raised from 65 to
67 years. To compensate for resulting future replacement rate reductions, in 2001 the
German government started to promote the development of private pensions by means
of special saving subsidies and tax incentives, the so-called ‘Riester’ pension scheme.
Participation in the ‘Riester’ pension scheme is voluntary. Evidence from micro data
suggests that the stimulating effect of the ‘Riester’ pension scheme on private old-age
provision in case of low income households is small (for Germany, see Corneo et al.,
2009). Hence, together with high and positive Gini elasticities for investment income,
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the evidence suggests that such a reform is likely to increase inequality among elderly
in the future, and that old-age poverty might become a more important issue in future
decades. To mitigate these effects, one could try to enhance participation rates of low
income households in private retirement plans either through higher saving subsidies
or through making participation compulsory.
Finally, some words about the intertemporal comparability of results. As two ref-
erees correctly pointed out, our database is cross-sectional in structure, and derived
point estimates must be complemented by standard errors or confidence intervals for
examining the statistical significance of results. This is what we have done in the
present version of this chapter. In this sense, our results also contribute to closing
the ’lack of statistical inference in the literature on measurement of income inequality’
(Athanasopoulos and Vahid, 2003, p.415). To ensure intertemporal comparability
of estimates, we have spent a lot effort on ensuring that our income variable, pre-
tax-post-transfer equivalent incomes, which is constructed from various EVS variables,
contains intertemporally consistent information. What we have to take as given is the
top coding of incomes, potentially resulting in downward-biased inequality estimates,
and the exclusion of residents in nursing homes or other institutional accommodations
from the database.
Chapter 3
Evolution of Incomes and Inequality
Since the German Reunification: The
Case of German Elderly1
3.1 Introduction
The reforms referring to German old-age security will affect both income level as well
as income composition of the elderly. As an example, the rise in retirement age and
the introduction of the ‘factor of sustainability’2 may lower the relative importance of
payments from statutory pensions, whereas the importance of income from employ-
ment will rise. At the same time, it is to be expected that the relative importance
of capital income will rise as well, since politicians intend to strengthen self-reliance
for old-age income by implementing subsidies for private provision (e.g. ‘Riester’ and
‘Rürup’ pension schemes). Thereby individuals, even though belonging to the same
age cohort, will react in different ways. As an example with respect to the retirement
age Astleitner et al. (2010) observe a dependence on the occupational category
resulting from differences in physical and mental loadings. The same holds for financial
opportunities and willingness to make private provision.
In this article we employ data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
to examine the income distribution for the age cohort 55 and older since the German
Reunification. Throughout the period under consideration, we provide price-adjusted
annual pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent incomes. In the following we analyze the evo-
lution of the financial situation, the changes in income composition as well as the
evolution of income distribution for the elderly. Additionally, we investigate the spe-
1The chapter is a translated version of Bönke et al. (2011).
2The ‘factor of sustainability’ (Nachhaltigkeitsfaktor) was introduced by the ‘Pension Scheme Sustain-
ability Law’ (RV Nachhaltigkeitsgesetz ) of 2004 and came into effect in 2005. It is a mathematical
term that was incorporated in the pension formula in order to account for the increasing relation of
pensioners to employees. In the long-term the introduction will lower replacement rates by about 15
percentage points (see Grimm, 2005).
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cial impact of different income components on inequality. As measure of inequality we
use the Gini index and with the bootstrap method we test the statistical significance
of our results. Hence, from a methodological point of view we mostly follow Chapter 2.
However, Chapter 2 is based on the German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure
(EVS), a distinct dataset which has not yet covered the current years. By employing
the SOEP we are enabled to close this time gap. In so far, this study can be regarded
as a current completion of previous works on the income distribution of the elderly in
Germany (see Biewen, 2004; Bönke et al., 2010; Börsch-Supan et al., 2001;
Münnich, 2001; Schwarze and Frick, 2000).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
database and describes its processing. Section 3.3 explains inequality measures, the
bootstrap method and statistical test procedures employed. The empirical results are
provided in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Construction of the Database
Our analysis focuses on the period after the German reunification. Hence, we apply
SOEP waves ‘i’ to ‘z’, whereas wave ‘i’ corresponds to the year 1992 and contains
income information of 1991, wave ‘j’ information on income of 1992, and so on.3
In data processing we mostly follow the methodology applied in Chapter 2. We
exclusively consider households with at least one household member older than 55
years. As we are only interested in the elderly, we delete those persons of the selected
households which are younger than 55 years. Additionally, we only include the first
two household members.4 Hence, our subsample consists of artificial 1- and 2-person-
units, whose single members are all 55 years and older. In the following we call these
households ‘units of elderly persons’ (UEP).
Concerning the income concept, we provide annual pre-tax-post-transfer equiva-
lent incomes price-adjusted to 2000. In applying a gross-income-concept, we take into
consideration that UEP are not necessarily taxable income-units. In those cases the
calculation of a common tax burden would be restricted by strict assumptions. Ad-
ditionally, our procedure enables us to exclude distributional effects, resulting from
intertemporal changes of the tax legislation (for further justification of the income
concept see Chapter 2.2). To take into account differences in needs between 1- and
2-person-UEP, we apply the modified-OECD equivalence scale (see OECD, 2009). In-
comes of 2-person-UEP are deflated to equivalent incomes by division with the factor
1.5.
The construction of equivalent incomes underlies a further difficulty. Most of the
income variables are provided on individual level, although there are some exceptions
where information is provided on household level. In order to generate the total in-
come of a UEP we follow the methodology introduced in Chapter 2. We sum up all
the individual incomes of those persons regarded as household members in our dataset.
Additionally, we assign by proportion those incomes, which are provided only on house-
hold level. The proportionality is given by the number of persons in an UEP divided
by the number of persons originally attributed to the SOEP-household.5
3Information on income and personal characteristics are provided by the so-called PEQUIV-datasets.
Our analysis is based on the following SOEP-subsamples: A (Western Germany), B (Foreigner), C
(Eastern Germany), E (Additional Sample, 1999), F (Additional Sample, 2001). Hence, we disregard
the subsamples D (Immigrants), G (Sample of the Rich) and H (Additional Sample, 2007).
4Within the questionnaire of the SOEP, each household can chose the ranking of the household
members on its own. This applies to all household members except for the first person in the
household, which has to be the head of the household. From every household we keep the first two
persons of age 55 years and older in our dataset. Hence, we cannot give generalities on the position
or function of the elderly which comprise our households. Our decision to keep the first two persons
of age 55 years and older is driven by the assumption that households rank their members according
to their contributions to household income.
5An alternative manner in the construction for equivalence incomes consists in attributing the whole
original SOEP-household-income to the UEP and deflating it by an equivalence scale comprising all
SOEP-household-members. We opt for the prior procedure in order to approximate the self-earned
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In constructing the UEP gross equivalent incomes, we incorporate the following
five income sources: (a) employment income: earned income and self-employed income
(including special payments like Christmas and holiday money, annual bonuses as well
as thirteenth and fourteenth salary); (b) retirement income: retirement pensions from
the public pension fund, civil servant’s pensions, company pensions, and other pen-
sions; (c) transfer income: benefits related to former employment, social assistance,
family-related benefits and other transfers; (d) capital income6; and (e) other income.
Concerning the minor relevance of other income we refrain from a single analysis of this
income source in the following. However, other income is an integrant of equivalent
income.
The last step of database construction is concerned with the adjustment of incomes
to ensure intertemporal comparability. Thereby, we make use of the price-index given
by the SOEP. Hence, all incomes are adjusted to prices of 2000.7 Additionally, we trim
the data in order to prevent biases caused by outliers at the upper and lower bound of
the distribution. For this purpose, we eliminate for each year those UEP which exhibit
the lowest four and the highest two percent of price-adjusted equivalent incomes.8 9
The following analysis distinguishes between UEP living in the Old and the New
German Laender (OL and NL) as well as between pensioner and non-pensioner UEP
(P-UEP and NP-UEP). The latter distinction is made based on the income source
at old-age. If the retirement income exceeds the income from employment, a UEP
is assigned to the group of pensioner UEP and vice versa. The resulting unweighted
number of household units can be found in Table 3.1.10
income of the elderly, instead of considering the financial possibilities elderly persons face in case of
income-pooling.
6In the following also referred to as investment income.
7In Chapter 2 prices are adjusted to 2003.
8In Chapter 2 we refrain from this trimming.
9We decided for this asymmetric trimming to cope with two features concerning the data. First,
the trimming of four percent at the lower bound of the income distribution ensures the elimination
of observations with zero or implausible low income over all cross-sections. Second, the cutting of
the highest two percent of price-adjusted equivalent income eliminates the most severe outliers by
keeping the loss of observations to a minimum.
10In Chapter 2 the group of pensioner UEP is more broadly defined, since all UEP with strict positive
retirement incomes are assigned as pensioners.
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Table 3.1: Unweighted number of household units (SOEP)
Pensioners Non pensioners
Year Total Sample Size OL NL OL NL
1991 2,268 1,024 379 561 286
1992 2,308 1,056 385 574 293
1993 2,320 1,057 404 567 292
1994 2,326 1,023 418 608 277
1995 2,326 1,012 481 594 239
1996 2,312 1,034 475 574 229
1997 2,704 1,270 525 656 253
1998 2,597 1,224 517 604 252
1999 5,020 2,586 916 1,135 383
2000 4,557 2,343 882 991 341
2001 4,419 2,261 859 968 331
2002 4,376 2,282 859 908 327
2003 4,314 2,239 852 914 309
2004 4,196 2,037 827 925 307
2005 4,117 2,123 816 874 304
2006 3,984 2,030 794 855 305
2007 3,869 1,966 775 820 308
2008 4,426 2,224 850 975 377
Note: Unweighted number of household units with elderly members.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (Waves 1992–1009).
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3.3 Measurement of Inequality: Methodological Con-
siderations
3.3.1 Construction of a Quasi-Homogeneous Population
All our empirical results are based on a quasi-homogeneous population of pseudo-1-
person-UEP. In order to generate that kind of population, it is essential to take into
account three information for each UEP, h = 1, . . . , H: (a) number of considered elderly
persons, nh ∈ [1; 2], living in a SOEP-household with Nh ≥ nh persons, (b) h’s SOEP-
weighting factor, hrfh,11 and (c) h’s equivalence income,
∑A
a=1
∑I
i=1 y
a
i,h+
∑I
i=1
nh
Nh
·yi,h
(1+0.5·(nh−1)) ,
where yai,h indicates the individual income of income component i drawn from per-
son a in household h. The second term of the summation in the numerator refers to
those incomes only stated on household level. Hence, nh
Nh
·yi,h represents the share of the
household income from income source i assigned to the elderly persons of h. Finally,
we generate the quasi-homogeneous population by allocating the equivalent income yh
to each member nh of the UEP and by weighting the UEP with the corresponding
weighting-factor hrfh. As an example, assume H = 2, with n1 = 1, y1 = 100, hrf1 = 2
and n2 = 2, y2 = 150, hrf2 = 3. Accordingly, the corresponding quasi-homogenous
population consists of n1 · hrf1 = 2 pseudo-1-person-UEP possessing an equivalent
income of 100 monetary units and of n2 · hrf2 = 6 pseudo-1-person-UEP possessing
an equivalent income of 150 monetary units. By applying this approach, we follow
the principle of normative individualism. This is, instead of analyzing the material
situation of (homogeneous) households, an approach focussing on individuals.12
3.3.2 Inequality Indices, Inequality Decomposition and Boot-
strapping
We use the Gini index in order to measure inequality since it is additively decomposable
into single income components. Therefore, we are able to investigate the impact of dif-
ferent income sources on inequality. This is of interest because the reforms undertaken
and in preparation of the German pension system, will trigger a change in the income
composition of the elderly. It is to be expected that the importance of the payments
from the statutory pensions will decrease (‘factor of sustainability’, rise in retirement
age, etc.), whereas the importance of private old-age provision will rise (e.g. ‘Riester’
and ‘Rürup’ pension schemes). Additionally, it is to be expected that individuals at
the lower end of the income distribution will react to these changes in a different way
than those at the upper end.
We denote average equivalent income by µ, average equivalent income of income
11We make use of the household cross-section weighting factor, provided by the hhrf -SOEP dataset.
12See Bönke and Schröder (2010) for this and further alternative weighting procedures.
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component i by µi and wi = µiµ is the share of income component i on average total
equivalent income. Hence, the Gini coefficient G can be calculated in its additively
notation as follows:
G =
I∑
i=1
wiCi, (3.1)
where −1 ≤ Ci ≤ 1 denotes the concentration coefficient of income source i.13 Graph-
ically, the concentration coefficient corresponds to twice the area between the line of
perfect equity and the concentration curve of the income source under consideration,
derived by ordering the observations in terms of increasing total equivalent income
(not in terms of increasing level of income source i). Hence, the concentration coef-
ficient reveals the variance of income source i over the range of equivalent income in
total. The closer the concentration coefficient of an income component to −1(1), the
more are the individuals drawing a high share of their income from this component
concentrated at the lower (upper) end of the distribution of equivalent income. The
comparison between concentration and Gini coefficients allows making statements on
whether the component under consideration has an augmenting or diminishing impact
on inequality. In case of (Ci−G) > 0 ((Ci−G) < 0), an increase in average equivalent
income induced by component i causes an increase (decrease) in inequality, measured
by the Gini coefficient.
Gini elasticities are provided in order to reveal the influence of changes in factor
shares of different income components on inequality. The Gini elasticity of i, ηi, mea-
sures the percentage change in the Gini index with respect to an equiproportionate
marginal change in the equivalent income of i (see Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985;
Rao, 1969). It is defined as
ηi =
∂G
∂µi
µi
G
=
1
G
[
µi
µ
(Ci −G)
]
with
I∑
i=1
ηi = 0. (3.2)
Given that the reforms in the German pension system will trigger a shift in the income
composition of the elderly, such an isolated investigation of factor shares of different
income components, is of particular importance.
From (3.2) it can be seen that an income component affects the Gini index through
two different channels: (a) through its relative share in total equivalent income, wi;
and (b) through its spread over the range of total equivalent income, Ci. The impact
of wi and Ci on G between the periods t and t − x can be calculated using equation
13In the notation and decomposition of the Gini coefficient we follow Podder (1993) and Podder
and Chatterjee (2002), see Chapter 2 additionally.
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(3.1), as follows:
dG
dt
=
I∑
i=1
Ci,t
∂wi,t
∂t
+
I∑
i=1
wi,t
∂Ci,t
∂t
, (3.3)
or alternatively in discrete notation:
∆Gt ≈
I∑
i=1
(
Ci,t + Ci,t−x
2
)
∆wi,t +
I∑
i=1
(
wi,t + wi,t−x
2
)
∆Ci,t. (3.4)
The sum
∑I
i=1
(
Ci,t+Ci,t−x
2
)
∆wi,t is the change of the Gini index as a result of changes
in the shares of different income components in total equivalent income, the share
effect. The second term,
∑I
i=1
(wi,t+wi,t−x
2
)
∆Ci,t, quantifies the impact of changes in
concentration coefficients on overall inequality, the concentration effect (see Podder
and Chatterjee, 2002).
Since the SOEP is a random sample, all the information on income and the deduced
inequality measures can be interpreted as a realization of a random variable. Hence,
to test for statistical significance of results, we compute standard errors and confidence
intervals using the bootstrap method (see Mills and Zandvakili, 1997; Biewen,
2002). Concretely we draw 1000 random samples from each cross-section of elderly
people with replacement. Each random sample has as many sampling units as the
original cross-section, and each sampling unit in the original cross-section has the same
probability of being selected. Using the SOEP-weighting factors and the bootstrap-
weights, indicating how often a UEP is to be regarded in a bootstrap-sample, we
are able to calculate the above mentioned statistics for each of the single bootstrap-
samples.14
14See Athanasopoulos and Vahid (2003); Hall (1994) for further information and for the expla-
nation why bootstrap confidence intervals do not have to be symmetric about the point estimate.
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3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Development of the Income Level and the Income Com-
position
The most important indicator for the development of the financial situation of the
elderly in Germany is the evolution of their average equivalent income. Figure 3.1 and
Table 3.2 provide the appertaining information. Figure 3.1 displays how the level of
average equivalent income developed over time, differentiated by pensioner and non-
pensioner UEP as well as by region (New German Laender vs. Old German Laender).
Solid lines refer to UEP in the Old Laender and dashed lines to those in the New
Laender. The point estimates are connected by those lines. Vertical bars indicate
the period specific bootstrap confidence intervals. Table 3.2 provides the observed
changes in the average and median incomes (point estimates) over five-year intervals.
Additionally it provides the confidence intervals for those differences in brackets (see
Hall, 1994). The changes over time are not significant in those cases where the stated
95% confidence interval comprises the value zero. Additionally, changes in median
incomes (point estimates) can be inferred from the table.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of mean equivalent income (SOEP)
Figure 3.1 in combination with Table 3.2 shows an improvement of the financial
situation of the elderly in Germany between 1991 and the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury. This applies to all examined subgroups of elderly in Germany, the pensioner
and non-pensioner UEP in both German regions. However, in 2002/2003 income be-
gan to stagnate (P-UEP OL, NP-UEP NL) or even declined significantly (NP-UEP
OL, P-UEP NL). Over the whole period, those UEP living in the New Laender ex-
perience substantial and statistical significantly lower equivalent incomes than their
western counterparts. At the beginning of the observation period, right after the Ger-
man reunification, a reduction in the absolute income difference between both German
regions can be observed. In 2008 pensioner UEP in the Old Laender realize an aver-
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age equivalent income of 17.802e, so they exceed the reference value of the pensioner
UEP in the New Laender by 3.804e. The difference between east and west holds for
the group of non-pensioner UEP as well. Whereas the non-pensioner UEP in the Old
Laender earn an income of 30.212e, the corresponding amount of non-pensioner UEP
in the New Laender lies about 5.423e lower. Similarly, systematic differences can
be observed between the group of the non-pensioner UEP and that of the pensioner
UEP. Non-pensioner UEP exhibit a substantial higher income than the pensioner UEP.
In 2008 non-pensioner UEP display average equivalent incomes of 30.212e (OL) and
24.789e (NL), respectively. Hence, their incomes exceed those of their pensioner UEP
counterparts by 12.410e, or 10.071e respectively.
The evolution of the income shares referring to total equivalent income is pro-
vided by Figure 3.2 in combination with Table 3.3. Again, results are presented for
non-pensioner and pensioner UEP in the Old and the New Laender separately. By def-
inition, the share of retirement income on total equivalent income is substantial higher
for the group of pensioner UEP (85–90%) than for the group of non-pensioner UEP
(<10%). Regarding the latter, employment income is dominating. For the pensioner
UEP in the Old Laender, capital income is the second most important income com-
ponent. On average this income component displays a share of just under 10%, with
a slightly increasing trend during the last decade (see Table 3.3). For this subgroup,
employment income as well as transfer income is only of marginal importance. This
applies likewise to the pensioner UEP in the New Laender with the only distinction
that for this subgroup capital income does not play any role either. Hence, pensioner
UEP in the New Laender are almost only equipped with retirement income; a result
that holds over the whole observation period.
In case of the non-pensioner UEP, retirement income is the second most important
income source, whereas social transfers and capital income are hardly of importance.
This applies to both the non-pensioner UEP in the New Laender and the non-pensioner
UEP in the Old Laender. Table 3.3 shows that these results are very stable over
time: By tendency, the importance of capital income remains constant and as a whole,
the share of transfer income decreases. For the Old Laender, there is a small and
significant increase between 1993 and 1998. For the non-pensioner UEP in the New
Laender, a significant change in the income composition between 2003 and 2008 is
worth mentioning: A slight shift from transfer income to employment income can be
observed.
3.4.2 Development of the Income Distribution
Figure 3.3 displays the evolution of the income distribution for the four subsamples
measured by the Gini index. For the pensioner UEP in the Old Laender the Gini index
stays constant at about 25% over the whole observation period. This applies likewise to
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the pensioner UEP in the New Laender but at a clearly recognizable lower level of about
15–16%. Hence, income is more equally distributed between the pensioner UEP in the
eastern part of Germany. Since confidence intervals do not overlap, we can conclude
that these results are statistically significant. The low extent of inequality between
the pensioner UEP in the New Laender can be explained economically: pension claims
attained in the German Democratic Republic times are more equally distributed than
those attained in western Germany. This is due to lower differences in wages and a
higher female labor force participation rate.
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of income inequality (SOEP)
With respect to the non-pensioner UEP in the Old and in the New Laender, sig-
nificant differences in the Gini index can hardly be perceived. Overlapping confidence
intervals for the non-pensioner UEP in the Old and in the New Laender illustrate this
(see Figure 3.3). Thereby, the level of inequality is comparable to that of the pensioner
UEP in the Old Laender: at the beginning of the observation period the Gini index
is located at about 25% and levels out at 27%. This trend emerges, among others,
from the significant rise in the Gini index in the Old Laender of 3.09 percentage points
between 1993 and 1998 (see Table 3.4).
To sum up, inequality has hardly experienced any change over the observation pe-
riod. A significant rise of inequality can be observed exclusively in the Old Laender
(NP-UEP, 1993 to 1998). Comparisons between the subgroups reveal a higher inequal-
ity within the group of non-pensioner UEP than within the group of pensioner UEP.
Furthermore, incomes of the pensioner UEP in the New Laender are more equally
distributed than in the Old Laender. Regional differences cannot be observed for the
group of non-pensioner UEP.
Concentration coefficients, shown in Figure 3.4, contribute to a better understand-
ing of the above mentioned patterns. A concentration coefficient positioned above the
zero line indicates that UEP at the upper end of the income distribution benefit from
this income component in particular. The reverse holds for negative concentration co-
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of income concentration (SOEP)
efficients. The illustration is rather homogeneous for all the four subsamples. Capital
income and employment income accumulates strongest at the upper end of the income
distribution, whereas transfer incomes are located at the bottom. Retirement incomes
primary exhibit positive concentration coefficients, but they are located at a signifi-
cantly lower level than those of capital and employment. The results are very robust
over the whole observation period. Table 3.5 shows that there are significant intertem-
poral changes only in three cases: (a) pensioner UEP in the New Laender (transfer
incomes, 2003 to 2008), (b) pensioner UEP in the New Laender (capital income, 2003
to 2008) and (c) non-pensioner UEP in the Old Laender (employment income, 1993 to
1998).
The persistence of the income distribution is also mirrored in the consistency of
concentration and share effects over time, displayed in Table 3.6. Table 3.6 shows
the corresponding bootstrap confidence intervals as well as test results on statistical
significance. Significant changes can be observed for the pensioner UEP (OL, 1998
to 2003; OL, 1998 to 2003 and 2003 to 2008) as well as for the non-pensioner UEP
(OL and NL, 2003 to 2008). The positive differences of the share effects indicate an
intertemporal shift in the corresponding income shares which causes, ceteris paribus,
an increase in inequality.
The empirical analysis is completed by documenting the Gini elasticities for the
different income components of the year 2008 (see Table 3.7). The reported values can
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be interpreted as follows: The point estimate of ‘-0.1221’, associated to the retirement
income of the pensioner UEP in the Old Laender, means that an increase in retirement
income of one percentage point of this subsample causes a decrease in the Gini index
of 0.1221%. The ‘∗’ indicates that the result is significantly different from zero at a
5%-level. Concerning the pensioner UEP in both German regions, our results show
that an increase in the share of retirement income ensures a reduction of inequality.
The same holds for an increase in the share of transfer incomes, although the effect is
smaller. This can be explained by the relative low prominence of this income source
for both subsamples. On the opposite, a rise in the share of employment income
and especially in the share of capital income implies an increase in inequality for the
group of pensioner UEP. Both effects are more pronounced in the Old than in the New
Laender. Again, this can be attributed to the low share of capital income in the New
Laender. Referring to the non-pensioner UEP we can observe qualitatively comparable
results, although the effects caused by variations in the share of capital incomes are
statistically not significant. This observation is probably generated by the fact that
this income component constitutes only a marginal share of total equivalent income for
this subsample.
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Table 3.7: Gini elasticities in year 2008 (SOEP)
OL NL
Pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.0306* 0.0065
(95% CI) (0.0105; 0.0498) (-0.0173; 0.0292)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.1221* -0.0345*
(95% CI) (-0.1512; -0.0893) (-0.0684; -0.0015)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0132* -0.0178*
(95% CI) (-0.0209; -0.0047) (-0.0270; -0.0075)
Investments
ηˆ4 0.1053* 0.0458*
(95% CI) (0.0800; 0.1295) (0.0237; 0.0660)
Non-pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.0619* 0.0422
(95% CI) (0.0327; 0.0940) (-0.0133; 0.0901)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.0248* -0.0167
(95% CI) (-0.0441; -0.0050) (-0.0503; 0.0236)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0428* -0.0515*
(95% CI) (-0.0571; -0.0245) (-0.0729; -0.0243)
Investments
ηˆ4 0.0118 0.0263
(95% CI) (-0.0117; 0.0300) (-0.0044; 0.0530)
Note: ηˆi denotes the observed Gini elasticity of income component i. CI denotes Hall’s
confidence interval. *Elasticity is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (Wave 2009).
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3.5 Conclusion
Our analysis reveals an improved financial situation of the elderly today compared
to the period right after the German reunification. This holds in particular for the
pensioner and non-pensioner UEP in the New Laender. For the last decade however,
our results document a stagnation of the financial evolution of all four subsamples.
In case of the pensioner UEP, even a deterioration of the financial situation can be
observed.
Concerning inequality, we find Gini indices almost unchanged for all four subsam-
ples over the whole observation period. This stability in the income distribution is
not warranted, since Gini elasticities reveal that changes in the income composition
cause significant effects on income distribution. Hence, it is to be expected that imple-
mented political reforms in the field of old-age provision – like the rise in retirement
age (‘Rente mit 67’) and the simultaneous strengthening of self-reliance for old-age
provision (‘Riester-’ and ‘Rürup-Reform’) – are going to imply a twofold effect; on the
one hand on income level and on the other hand on income distribution between the
elderly in society. The reform ‘Rente mit 67’, implemented in order to give relieve to
the taxpayers and contributors to the public pension insurance, is actually accompa-
nied by a reduction of the effective pension level. Having the results concerning the
Gini elasticities of retirement incomes in mind, it is to be supposed that the reduction
of the pension level is associated with a rise in inequality among the elderly. Similarly,
the strengthening of self-reliance for old-age provision and the corresponding increase
in the share of capital income may cause a rise in inequality. This holds all the more,
since Corneo et al. (2009) find that the willingness for concluding ‘Riester-’ and/or
‘Rürup-Contracts’ increases in income.
Finally, we conduct a comparison of the results of both studies on income evo-
lution and inequality in Germany, as performed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Since
both studies follow a similar methodological procedure, a comparison concerning the
overlapping period seems to be appropriate, at least with respect to the qualitative
statements. Nevertheless, for such a comparison one has to recall that both studies are
based on different datasets. Additionally, the distinctions in data processing, presented
in Section 3.2, do not allow for a direct comparison of the quantitative results. Some
examples: Due to the more far-reaching definition of non-pensioner UEP in this chap-
ter (Chapter 3), a less pronounced distinction between the results is to be assumed.
Differences in the absolute income level are to be expected, because of varying striking
prices. Furthermore, data trimming conducted in this chapter is mirrored by a level of
inequality that lies below the inequality found in Chapter 2.
Conclusively, we find that both studies yield, concerning the overlapping period
1993–2003, similar qualitative results with respect to three main criteria: (a) evolution
of the financial situation, (b) evolution of inequality, and (c) algebraic sign of the Gini
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elasticities.
Referring to (a): Both studies display an improvement of the financial situation of
the elderly. Nevertheless, UEP in the New Laender could not close the gap to their
western counterparts. However, the strongest catching-up process can be observed
for the pensioner UEP in the New Laender. Likewise, both studies unveil a higher
volatility in growth for the non-pensioner UEP than for the pensioner UEP. The same
holds for the Old as well as for the New Laender.
Referring to (b): Qualitatively similar results can also be found for the development
of inequality, based on the Gini index. In 1993, income was more equally distributed
in the New than in the Old Laender. Whereas inequality remained almost constant
for the pensioner as well as for the non-pensioner UEP in the Old Laender, inequality
increased in the New Laender; slightly for the pensioner UEP, sharply for the non-
pensioner UEP. The increase in case of the latter was so sharp, that inequality almost
converged for this subsample in both the Old and New Laender.
Referring to (c): Even the comparative view with respect to the politically relevant
Gini elasticities displays qualitative consistency – at least concerning the statistically
significant results. For all subsamples under investigation it turns out, that an increase
in the share of employment and capital income raises inequality, whereas an increase in
transfer and pension incomes reduces inequality. The outstanding positive Gini elastic-
ity of capital income for pensioner UEP in both parts of Germany might be of special
political interest, because reforms strengthening self-reliance for old-age provision will
foster inequality between the elderly.
Chapter 4
Betting on a Long Life: The Role of
Subjective Life Expectancy in the
Demand for Private Pension Insurance
of German Households1
4.1 Introduction
The German welfare state comprises a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system
designed to prevent old-age poverty and to maintain standard of living after withdrawal
from working life. In contrast to funded systems, a PAYG plan is directly financed from
current contributions and therefore requires a nearly permanent balance of contribu-
tions and payments. Population aging and negative incentive effects have increasingly
threatened the German system and triggered a reform process to keep its financing
sustainable. This has been accompanied by a lively discussion of the opportunities and
limitations of the system, that has created awareness of falling replacement rates from
the public statutory system and the need for supplementary private old-age provision.
In addition to pure accumulation of financial and non-financial assets, investment in
private pension insurance policies presents one possible way to raise retirement income
and concomitantly insures against outliving one’s wealth. Consequences of shifting
substantial parts of old-age provision from the public to the private sector, however,
depend on the efficiency of this market.
A main concern over insurance markets raised by theoretical research, is the pres-
ence of information asymmetries between insurers and the insured that lead to market
failure due to moral hazard and adverse selection. As pension insurance covers the
financial risk related to longevity, moral hazard would be present if pension insurance
1The chapter is a slightly modified version of Schulte and Zirpel (2010), revise and resubmit at
Journal of Applied Social Science Studies.
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coverage induced life-prolonging behavior that cannot be observed by the insurer. Ad-
verse selection would be present if length of life could be more accurately predicted
by the insurant himself than by the insurer, and people expecting relatively long life
systematically purchased larger pension insurance coverage. Concerning moral hazard,
most people agree that in developed countries like Germany individual life-prolonging
activities can be seen as independent of pension insurance coverage. Moral hazard
is therefore reasonably assumed to be quantitatively negligible, if not non-existent.2
In contrast, adverse selection in pension insurance markets is a concern. As a conse-
quence of adverse selection, premiums rise and eventually become prohibitively high
for low-risk individuals who are pushed out of the market.
In an attempt to explain the observed low uptake of annuities – the so-called ‘an-
nuity puzzle’ – related studies consistently provide evidence for adverse selection in
the UK (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004) and the US annuities market
(see Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; Brown, 2001;
Brown et al., 2008a). First empirical evidence by Gaudecker and Weber (2004)
suggests that the German private pension market is also characterized by adverse se-
lection. If this was the case, it might be too expensive for individuals who expect to
die early to compensate public pension shortfalls by private pension insurance.
Our work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuity markets. In
contrast to most related studies that take the ‘Money’s Worth’ approach introduced
by Friedman and Warshawsky (1988), we investigate the existence of adverse se-
lection on the micro level. Our main interest is the explanatory power of subjective life
expectancy in the uptake of private pension insurance. According to previous research,
subjective life expectancy is a remarkably good predictor of actual lifetime. In particu-
lar, it is superior to predictions based on mortality tables as made by the insurers (see
Hamermesh, 1985; Hurd and McGarry, 1995, 2002). Expectations about lifetime
therefore represent private information and give a risk selection opportunity to the
insurants as return on investment of a pension insurance policy increases with lifetime.
Based on this finding, our work now seeks to answer the question whether people actu-
ally make use of their private information about lifetime when deciding about old-age
provision. If, conditional on other relevant determinants, subjective life expectancy
was positively associated with the probability of having supplementary private pension
insurance, this would indicate adverse selection in this market.
We will test this hypothesis using the German SAVE survey data on savings and old-
age provision. Guided by the theory of savings and the life cycle with uncertain time of
death beginning with Yaari (1965) and previous empirical studies, we provide an in-
depth analysis of the determinants of pension insurance uptake of German households
2This view is shared in large parts of the literature; see among others Finkelstein and Poterba
(2004) and Rothschild (2009) See, however, Philipson and Becker (1998) for a discussion of the
existence of moral hazard effects in the market for annuities.
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with a special focus on the role of subjective life expectancy. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview of the related theoretical
and empirical literature. The German old-age pension system is presented in Section
4.3. Section 4.4 describes the data and methodology in use and contains estimation
results. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Related Literature
Within an overall assessment of the determinants of pension insurance uptake, we
specifically focus on the role of subjective life expectancy to understand whether the
German private pension market is characterized by adverse selection. Our work thus
mainly relates to two broad strands in the literature. First, we refer to the theoretical
and empirical literature on life cycle savings and annuity demand dealing with optimal
annuitization in portfolio choice and practically relevant determinants of the annuiti-
zation decision. Second, we refer to the theoretical and empirical discussion of adverse
selection in insurance markets in general and in annuity markets in particular.
Yaari (1965) was the first who incorporated uncertain lifetimes in the classical life
cycle savings theory of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). His model is a theoret-
ical conjunction of mortality expectations and time and risk preference parameters in
determining optimal annuitization. The main implication of his theory of consumption
under the presence of longevity risk is that risk averse utility maximizing consumers
who face actuarially fair insurance prices should fully annuitize their wealth, provided
that they do not have any bequest motive. Davidoff et al. (2005) later confirmed
the complete annuitization result within a more general framework.
Compared to the theoretical predictions of full or at least high annuitization, ob-
served uptake of annuities is surprisingly low (see Friedman andWarshawsky, 1990;
Brown and Poterba, 2000; James and Song, 2001; James and Vittas, 2000).
This gap between theory and reality has caused a large body of literature dedicated
to resolve this so-called ‘annuity puzzle’. Among potential explanations for the puzzle
are adverse selection, administrative load factors, bequest motives, risk-sharing within
families, pre-existing annuities from social security, financial illiteracy and precaution-
ary savings for the event of unexpected expenditure shocks. In this context, Brown
(2001) empirically investigates the behavioral relevance of Yaari’s life cycle model by
relating a utility measure of annuity value to actual household decisions. Following
the life cycle model, he calculates the utility measure – the ‘annuity equivalent wealth’
– based on cohort mortality tables and survey data on risk aversion, marital status,
and the presence of pre-existing annuity flows from social security. Brown (2001)
finds that households for which the life cycle model predicts to have a higher valuation
of annuities are in fact more likely to annuitize their retirement resources. However,
in accordance with the annuity puzzle, much of the variation in the actual decision
remains unexplained by the life cycle model. He therefore considers several additional
factors that might influence the annuitization decision where he identifies individual
health status and time horizon to be the most relevant.
Related to our research purpose, the importance of individual health status in ex-
plaining the actual annuitization decision conditional on average mortality from life
tables is particularly interesting. It points to the fact that people use private informa-
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tion on health status and expected longevity in the old-age provision decision which
would be consistent with the presence of adverse selection in annuity markets. A gen-
eral theoretical framework of adverse selection was introduced by Akerlof (1970)
which Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) later applied to the insurance market. The
basic idea is that private information about individual risk gives insurants an informa-
tion advantage over the insurer which allows higher-risk individuals to self-select into
insurance contracts. Pooled risks are then comparatively high, insurance premiums
rise and crowd lower-risk individuals out of the market. Thus, the theory of adverse
selection predicts a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk.
A wide body of literature studies the empirical importance of adverse selection
in insurance markets. Two markets that have been frequently under study are the
automobile and the health insurance market. For the automobile insurance market,
the early studies of Dahlby (1983) and Puelz and Snow (1994) suggest a positive
coverage-risk correlation, which, however, was not reinforced by subsequent research
(see Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dionne et al., 2001). Conflicting findings
are also available for the health insurance market. While Cutler and Zeckhauser
(1998) support the theoretical prediction of positive correlation, Cardon and Hendel
(2001) and Fang et al. (2008) reject it. Available studies on the market for life
insurance (see Cawley and Philipson, 1999; McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010) so
far consistently suggest absence of adverse selection.3
Concerning annuity markets, the empirical literature rather uniformly concludes
that these are characterized by adverse selection. From a methodological point of
view, two different strands of empirical investigations of adverse selection in the mar-
ket for annuities can be distinguished. Roughly, the first strand compares mortality
data of annuitants and non-annuitants for the general population. This strand includes
the large number of studies that apply the concept of ‘Money’s Worth’ to identify how
much of an insurance premium’s deviation from the actuarily fair premium can be
attributed to selection effects. Friedman and Warshawsky (1988) introduced the
money’s worth approach which was later refined byMitchell et al. (1999). By now,
the money’s worth is commonly understood as the expected net present value of payouts
in relation to premium costs which is separately calculated using population and insur-
ance mortality tables. Several studies applied this concept to investigate the extent of
adverse selection in annuity markets in various countries. Most frequently studied are
the markets in the US (see Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al.,
1999) and in the UK (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004). Further exami-
nations have been done for Germany (see Gaudecker and Weber, 2004), Australia
(see Doyle et al., 2004) and Singapore (see Doyle et al., 2004; Fong, 2002),
as well as for Canada, Chile, Israel and Switzerland (see James and Song, 2001).
3See Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a recent review of the empirical literature on adverse selection
in insurance markets.
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McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) and Rothschild (2009) also compare mortality
tables of policyholders with those of the general population, but do not explicitly cal-
culate the money’s worth. All these studies find evidence for adverse selection which,
however, can only partially explain the annuity puzzle due to its limited extent.
The more recent second strand, where our study belongs to, analyzes adverse selec-
tion from the perspective of the policyholder using micro level data. While the focus
of the first strand lies on a quantitative estimation of the effects of adverse selection on
insurance premiums, the second strand is able to simultaneously assess the relevance of
subjective life expectancy and other determinants of annuity uptake. In addition, the
money’s worth does not allow to distinguish between active mortality selection based
on asymmetric information about health and expected longevity and passive mortality
selection reflecting other differences such as wealth and income that are also correlated
with mortality (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002).
Due to data limitations, research on the micro level is hardly done. Most closely
related to our analysis, is the study by Brown et al. (2008a) who use data from the
US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They investigate self-reported willingness
of the elderly population to exchange part of their social security inflation-indexed
annuity benefit for an immediate lump-sum payment by self-reported health status
and subjective survival probabilities relative to actuarial life tables. Their results are
consistent with predictions of standard theoretical models of adverse selection, since
individuals with poor health-status and pessimistic life expectations are less likely to
annuitize, but tend to prefer lump-sum payments. Another related study by Inkmann
et al. (2011) uses the English Longitudinal Study of Aging and investigates actual
annuity uptake in the UK. In line with Brown et al. (2008a), they find that the
subjective survival probabilities of annuitants are significantly higher than those of
their non-policyholding counterparts which points to the presence of adverse selection
in the UK’s annuity market as well.
Our work differs from the existing studies in several aspects: Compared to the US
and the UK, Germany is characterized by a dominant public statutory system which
leaves a relatively smaller scope for supplementary private insurance. Consequently,
selection effects in the private pension insurance market in Germany are likely to differ
from those observed in the US and the UK. In contrast to Brown et al. (2008a)
who consider stated intentions to annuitize retirement income, we are able to observe
actual demand for private pension insurance of households. Compared to Inkmann
et al. (2011), we dispose of a more comprehensive set of variables, as we are able
to build proxies for preference parameters reflecting risk aversion and time preference
that are not included in their data. Unlike Brown et al. (2008a) and Inkmann
et al. (2011), we use subjective life expectancy in years instead of subjective survival
probabilities in percent. This overcomes the difficulties respondents might have with
thinking in probabilities, especially when it comes to very low or very large probabilities
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as suggested by prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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4.3 The German Old-Age Pension System
For our further analysis, it is instructive to briefly examine the German old-age pension
system which consists of three coexisting pillars. Three things should be noted from
the following description. First, the public first pillar is still by far the most important
source of old-age income. Second, benefit levels from the first pillar differ for different
population groups mainly depending on their type of employment. Third, the private
pension insurance considered in our work is part of the third pillar and allows anyone
to supplement pre-existing benefits.
Introduced by Otto von Bismarck in 1889 as a fully funded system, the German pub-
lic old-age pension system was gradually converted into a PAYG system from 1957 on.
Outstanding generosity was a key characteristic of the German system after the 1972
reform in terms of both replacement rates and flexibility of retirement age. However,
increasing life expectancy in times of low fertility and the resulting population aging
coupled with negative incentive effects began to threaten the system. Starting with a
major reform in 1992, benefit cuts were implemented in an effort to stabilize its func-
tioning (see Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004). Nowadays, the so-called ‘first pillar’
of the three-pillar old-age provision system comprises statutory pension insurance for
all employees covered by the German social security system, old-age security for farm-
ers, professional provision for certain groups of self-employed like physicians, lawyers
and architects as well as the civil-service pension scheme. Except for the self-employed
who are at liberty to participate, the whole work force is subject to mandatory coverage
within the first pillar. Although the relative importance of the three pillars has changed
in disfavor of the first pillar, it still constitutes the most important source of old-age
income. In 2007, the public pension scheme covered about 92% of the German elderly
and accounted for about 79% of total gross old-age income (see ASID 07, 2009).
The various subsystems within the first pillar, like the old-age security for farmers
or the civil-service pension scheme have neither historically been equally generous, nor
have they undergone benefit cuts in an equal measure. In particular, in 2007, persons
of age 65 and older whose last position was denoted as civil-servant, drew an average
monthly gross pension of 2670e from the public system. This amounted to an average
of 1195e for former blue- and white-collar worker and to only 813e for former farmers
and self-employed who were least secured by the public scheme (see ASID 07, 2009).
Employees in the private and the public sector are free to supplement their benefits
from the mandatory statutory pension insurance by an occupational pension scheme
within the ‘second pillar’. This is typically organized in form of deferred compensations,
where employees waive part of their salary in favor of employer-provided retirement
benefits. In 2007, benefits from occupational pension plans represented about 9% of
total old-age income and accrued to 27% of the retirees (see ASID 07, 2009). Private
old-age provision as the ‘third pillar’ involves additional accumulation of assets like
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investment funds, shares, real-estate, private pension insurance and life insurance that
can be depleted during retirement. From 2002 and 2005 on, the third pillar also
includes the state-subsidized Riester- and Rürup pension plans. Overall, the third
pillar accounted for 12% of total old-age incomes in 2007 (see ASID 07, 2009).
Our analysis of adverse selection in pension insurance focuses on the uptake of
private pension insurance within the third pillar because access to private pension
insurance is open for everybody and the uptake is purely voluntary. Riester- and
Rürup pension plans are excluded because of the state subsidies that distort their
uptake.
Anybody is at liberty to purchase a private pension policy to raise retirement in-
come. Individual premiums are generally calculated based on insurance mortality ta-
bles by age and gender. While benefits are usually paid out as a monthly pension,
most insurance companies offer the option of a single lump-sum payment, instead. In
both cases, a minimum benefit is guaranteed, while any profit bonus is uncertain and
depends on the development of the capital market. Insurance companies offer various
supplemental agreements for the standard policy, mostly related to dependants’ pro-
tection. In a standard contract, pensions are paid until the policyholder dies. In order
to avoid highly negative returns of investment, guarantee periods, survivor’s pensions
or contribution refund in case of early death can be agreed upon with the insurer.
These additional agreements all come at some cost in the sense of lower pensions for a
given monthly contribution. Finally, it should be noted that redemption of a purchased
policy is financially highly disadvantageous, since contributions for the first years are
used to cover broker remuneration and administrative expenses.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis of Insurance Determinants
We now investigate the determinants of private pension insurance demand of German
households in a probit model. Section 4.4.1 describes the data and the derived variables.
The methodology is explained in Section 4.4.2 that also contains estimation results.
4.4.1 Data and Derived Variables
The cross-sectional data in use is the 2005 wave of the German SAVE study consisting
of 2305 households. SAVE is a nationally representative survey of German households
held by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). With the
main focus on savings behavior, financial assets and old-age provision, the survey also
includes data on demographic, economic and psychologic characteristics of households.
A first experimental wave was launched in 2001. From 2005 on, SAVE is an annually
conducted panel of more than 2000 households.4
We choose the level of the analysis to be the household because we view old-age
provision as a household and not an individual task. Furthermore, the data only
contains information on insurance contracts of households and does not allow to dis-
tinguish between different policyholders within households. Our attention is restricted
to non-retired households where neither the head nor the spouse has retired because
old-age provision occurs before retirement. The dependent variable PPI in our probit
regression is a binary variable indicating whether a household holds a private pension
insurance policy in 2005.5 Independent variables are grouped into (a) the theoretically
motivated explanatory variables life expectancy, risk and time preferences, (b) con-
trol variables for substitutive old-age provision and financial literacy and (c) control
variables for other household socio-economic characteristics.
(a) Life expectancy, risk aversion and time preference
Average subjective life expectancy per household is calculated in three steps. First,
respondents are asked to estimate average life expectancy of men and women of their
age group (AV LEmale and AV LEfemale). Second, they indicate the number of years
they expect themselves to deviate from the average life expectancy of people of their
sex and age (EXPY EARSDEVhead). Also, they indicate the number of years they
4Details on the the design of the SAVE study can be found in Schunk (2007) and Börsch-Supan
et al. (2008a). Item nonresponse in SAVE is adressed by an iterative multiple imputation procedure
using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Provided a properly performed imputation, regression
based on multiply imputed data leads to efficiency gains and avoids potential biases from systematic
nonresponse. We will therefore take advantage of the five imputed data sets for SAVE 2005 provided
by MEA. For further information on the imputation procedure used in SAVE, see Börsch-Supan
et al. (2008a), Schunk (2008) and Ziegelmeyer (2009).
5The precise wording in the survey is ’Other contractually agreed private pension scheme, e.g. invest-
ment funds geared specifically to the provision of pension cover, private pension insurance policies
which are not promoted by the state or which were taken out before such support was available.’
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expect their partner to deviate from the average life expectancy of his/her sex and
age (EXPY EARSDEVspouse). Subjective life expectancy for the household head is
implicitly given by this information and can be calculated as SLEhead = AV LE(fe)male+
EXPY EARSDEVhead. Calculation of subjective life expectancy for the spouse relies
on two (weak) assumptions: first, sex of the spouse is assumed to be opposite to the one
of the head, and, second, age of the spouse is assumed to be about the same as the one of
the head.6 7 It is then given by SLEspouse = AV LE(fe)male+EXPY EARSDEVspouse.8
Risk attitudes and time preferences of the household head are indirectly inferred
from hypothetical choices inquired in the survey. Table 4.1 displays the two sets of
options that are used for their derivation. In the first set, people are requested to
choose between options A and B in three different hypothetical lotteries. A is always
a certain zero, while B implies a 50% chance of loosing 100e and a 50% chance of
winning 200e, 300e and 400e, respectively. RISKAV ERSE is a dummy variable
that is equal to one for the most risk averse individuals who always opt for A, even in
the third lottery where potential payment in B is highest.
Table 4.1: Hypothetical choices to elicit risk and time preferences
First Set 1 2 3
A 100% 0 0 0
B 50% -100 -100 -100
50% 200 300 400
Second Set 1 2 3
A now -800 -800 -800
B in 10 months -825 -870 -990
Source: The German SAVE Study (2005).
In the second set, the hypothetical choice is not between certain and uncertain
payments, but between payments at different points in time. In each scenario, A is
an immediate payment of 800e, while B is a payment of 825e, 870e and 990e in
10 months. IMPATIENT is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the most
impatient individuals that always opt for paying in 10 months even if the postponed
payment is highest.9 We are only able to infer preferences of the household head, but
6We view even the latter assumption as non-critical, since, on average, the household head is only
0.17 years older than his or her spouse in the 864 partner households with a standard deviation of
5.31 years.
7In a similar manner, Brown (2001), Brown et al. (2008a) and Inkmann et al. (2011) refer to
individual expected survival probabilities. Data limitations force most other studies to make either
use of aggregate mortality tables or the less nuanced self-assessed health status as a proxy.
8Obviously, our variable subjective life expectancy can be subject to measurement errors, induced by
the inability to predict personal subjective life expectancy appropriately. However, we decided to use
subjective life expectancy to explain the uptake of private pension insurance, since previous research
points to the fact that it is a remarkably good predictor of actual lifetime (see Hurd andMcGarry,
1995, 2002).
9Comparable measures for risk aversion based on hypothetical lottery choices inquired in surveys are
4.4 Empirical Analysis of Insurance Determinants 61
not of the spouse which, however, is less a concern since the head states to be involved
in financial decision-making in 95% of all cases.
(b) Financial literacy and substitutive old-age provision
Since old-age provision is a complex matter that requires a certain degree of knowl-
edge in financial affairs, we account for the financial literacy of households by their
stock market participation. More precisely, FINLIT is a dummy variable indicating
whether the household holds equity and real-estate funds or other financial assets like
equity bonds, discount certificates, hedge funds, wind power funds, film funds and
other financial innovations. Stock market participation is an appropriate proxy for
financial literacy as investment in this type of assets reveals a certain level of financial
sophistication (see Rooij et al., 2007).10 11
As private pension insurance is only one component of overall old-age provision,
we need to take into account expected benefits from the first and second pillar as
well as other types of third pillar old-age provision like real estate property, Riester
pension plans, equity funds etc. We use type of employment of the main earner
in order to approximate the expected benefit level from the first pillar of the old-
age provision system due to the previously noted substantially varying benefit levels
by type of employment. Employment is classified in four categories: civil servant
(CIV SERV ), white/blue-collar worker (WORKER), self-employed (SELFEMPL)
and unemployed (UNEMPL).
Part of the population is eligible to occupational pension schemes and the govern-
ment-subsidized Riester pension plans. We control for benefits from these sources by a
variable containing the end of December 2004 balances of occupational pension schemes
and Riester contracts (OTHINS). We also control for total private wealth that can be
used by Salm (2006) and Brown et al. (2008a). Cutler et al. (2008) furthermore suggests
indicators like drinking and smoking behaviour, job-based mortality risk, preventive care and the
use of seat belts that are also frequently used. An analogous measure of time preference is derived
by Brown et al. (2008a) from an experimental module in the 2004 HRS. Other studies rely on
the length of the financial planning horizon to proxy for time preferences (see Salm, 2006; Brown
et al., 2008a).
10The related empirical literature uses various other measures to capture financial literacy. Brown
(2001) and Inkmann et al. (2011) rely on the general education level, whileMottola and Utkus
(2007) gather from demographic characteristics to financial experience. Yet others use contact with
tax advisors (see Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b) or create indices by dint of direct investigations
in surveys (see Agnew et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008a; Bucher-Koenen, 2009).
11We are aware of the fact that financial literacy and stockmarket participation do not have to be
identically. Hence, we checked to make use of quiz-like questions to capture the respondents’ financial
literacy, since SAVE contains quiz-like questions from 2007 to 2009. Assuming financial literacy to
be constant over time and applying this measure to households for which it is available, however,
would result in a loss of sample size of about 30%. Instead, we use these later waves to validate our
proxy: Correlations between stockmarket participation and correctness of answers to the financial
literacy questions are substantial and highly significant. For instance, the tetrachoric correlation
between stockmarket participation and a binary variable indicating three out of three correctly
answered questions lies between 0.4 and 0.5 depending on the wave and is significantly different
from zero at levels of less than 0.001.
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used to maintain consumption levels during retirement. NETWEALTH is the sum of
all assets excluding pension insurance. It consists of financial assets, business property,
real property and other assets net of total debt. In some estimation specifications, the
latter two types of substitutive old-age provision are adjusted by equivalence scales to
account for differing financial needs of single and partner households (OTHINSEQ,
NETWEALTHEQ). We divide insurance balances and net wealth by 1.5 for partner
households following the modified-OECD equivalence scale that assigns a weight of 0.5
to the second adult in a household. Additionally, we include NETWEALTHEQSQ
to take possible nonlinear effects into account.
Table 4.2: Sample means of dependent and independent variables by private pension
insurance holdings
Estimation Sample PPI=1 PPI=0
N=1320 N=206 (16%) N=1114 (84%)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
AVSLE 78.85 7.45 79.98 7.00 78.64 7.52
RISKAVERSE* 0.65 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48
IMPATIENT* 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32
FINLIT* 0.23 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.20 0.40
CIVSERV* 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24
WORKER* 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.63 0.48
SELFEMPL* 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.08 0.27
NETWEALTHEQ 126391.04 654089.98 158505.88 378974.84 120452.38 690881.82
NETWEALTHEQSQ
1000000 444400.00 9266000.00 183180.00 1669200.00 492800.00 10046000.00
NETWEALTH 177730.02 963460.62 228605.02 566677.04 168322.22 1016677.22
OTHINSEQ 2060.69 8313.76 3837.97 11988.97 1732.04 7397.30
OTHINS 2917.71 11651.37 5457.61 16848.50 2448.04 10350.31
AVAGE 41.14 10.86 41.10 8.75 41.14 11.21
AVAGESQ 1810.25 888.30 1765.70 715.02 1818.48 916.80
NRCHILD 1.55 1.31 1.46 1.15 1.56 1.34
PARTNER* 0.65 0.48 0.76 0.43 0.64 0.48
MARRIED* 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.59 0.49
NETINCEQ 1447.86 1687.41 1807.97 2443.28 1381.27 1498.79
NETINCEQSQ
1000 4941.50 35220.00 9209.41 67900.00 4152.28 24900.00
NETINC 2465.45 2801.94 3100.61 3410.99 2348.00 2659.40
EAST* 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Note: Sample means are averaged over the five datasets. Variables marked with * are dummy
variables.
Source: The German SAVE Study (2005). Own calculations.
(c) Socio-economic characteristics
Finally, we control for households’ socio-economic characteristics that we assess to be
relevant for the insurance choice. Average age, AV AGE, is supposed to represent the
maturity status of the household in its life cycle. AV AGESQ, the squared average age,
is included to allow for a possible nonlinear effect of age. PARTNER is a dummy vari-
able designed to distinguish partner and single households. Alternatively, we include
MARRIED that identifies married respondents. NRCHILD equals the number of
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children and stepchildren of the head and his spouse.12 EAST is a dummy variable that
characterizes households located in Eastern Germany. NETINC(EQ(SQ)) is the net
(equivalent(squared)) income of the household that should control for its purchasing
power and possible nonlinear effects.13
The original sample size reduces to an estimation sample of 1320 households due
to the following exclusion rules: First, only non-retired households where neither the
head nor the spouse has retired are considered (836 observations). Second, we drop
households with inconsistent estimates of personal life expectancy, where the indicated
average life expectancy of people of their age and sex is less than current age (5 obser-
vations). Third, all households with a missing value for the dependent variable PPI
are excluded (144 observations). The reason is that missing values were imputed using
variables that will be partially included on the right hand side of the regression equa-
tion which would otherwise yield a self-made correlation. Means of the variables and
their cross-correlations for the estimation sample are given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.14 15
12The presence of children is accounted for to capture a possible bequest motive in old-age provi-
sion (see Hurd, 1987; Bernheim, 1991; Johnson et al., 2004; Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b;
Inkmann et al., 2011). Yet other authors rely on self-reported importance of bequest motives (see
Brown, 2001) or the existence of a will or trust (see Brown et al., 2008a).
13In contrast to the substitutive old-age provision where we only adjust for a partner, we also account
for children when calculating net equivalent income. The reason is that the ability to pay insurance
premiums from current income depends on the presence of children, whereas retirement income
typically only serves the financial needs of the parents. Calculation of net equivalent income of
a household conceptually again follows the modified-OECD equivalence scale. Some specifications
contain the net equivalent income, others the unadjusted net income. We also considered an alterna-
tive income measure roughly adjusted for subsistence income as defined by the Hartz IV regulations
which, however, left our results unaffected.
14Generally note the following: We observe holdings of private pension insurance and household
characteristics in 2005 or end December 2004. Theory suggests that starting from a situation
without an insurance policy, a household implicitly calculates his net benefit from buying insurance
in any given period. If this benefit is positive, the household buys a private pension insurance policy.
In consecutive periods, the problem changes into the one of keeping or selling the previously bought
policy. Selling a policy implies a financial loss due to administrative expenses. A critical point in
our analysis is that we are unable to distinguish between new and old policyholders. Hence, there
might be households in our sample that keep a policy though they would not buy it if they could
newly decide in 2005. It would therefore be meaningful to run a similar analysis on the uptake of
private pension insurance policies with panel data which, however, requires a larger sample size and
a stable panel structure.
15In order to give an overview on the dependence of the independent variables in use, we show the cross-
correlations between the variables in Table 4.3. An alternative to study the patterns of relationship
among the dependent variables would be the application of a factor analysis. However, for reasons
of simplicity we decided to present cross-correlations.
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4.4.2 Estimation and Results
To estimate determinants of private pension insurance uptake, we specify a probit
model with the dichotomous dependent variable PPIi for all households i = 1 . . . N .
PPIi takes the value one for households holding a private pension insurance policy in
2005 and occurs with the conditional response probability pi for given values of the
independent variables Xi:
PPIi =
{
1 with probability pi = Pr(PPIi = 1 | Xi)
0 with probability (1− pi) = Pr(PPIi = 0 | Xi)
(4.1)
It is illustrative to interpret the binary response model as an outcome of an underlying
latent variable model where the latent variable PPI∗i can generally be modeled as
PPI∗i = Xiβ + εi. (4.2)
In the probit framework, the residual error term is assumed to be standard normally
distributed. If the latent dependent variable PPI∗i exceeds a certain threshold (here
set to zero), the observed outcome PPIi is equal to one:
PPIi =
{
1 if PPI∗i > 0
0 if PPI∗i ≤ 0
(4.3)
Combining equations (4.1) and (4.2) allows to express the individual probability of
having private pension insurance as Pr(PPIi = 1) = F (Xiβ), where the parametric
function F (.) is assumed to be the (standard) normal cumulative distribution function.
As usual, we estimate the probit model by maximum-likelihood estimation. To deal
with item non-response, we take advantage of the five multiply imputed data sets pro-
vided by MEA and combine the separate complete-data results by the method known
as Rubin’s Rule. This method averages estimated coefficients across datasets and takes
within-imputation and between-imputation variances into account when calculating
standard errors of the estimates (see Rubin, 1987).
We distinguish between a model with purely theory-led explanatory variables and
six different specifications where vectors of previously derived control variables Xi are
included. The underlying latent model is thus specified as
PPI∗i = β1+β2AV SLEi+β3RISKAV ERSEi+β4IMPATIENTi(+Xiβ)+εi. (4.4)
Table 4.4 displays average marginal effects calculated using Rubin’s Rules for multi-
ply imputed data for the model without control variables and six different specifications
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with control variables.16 Summaries of the estimations are given in Appendix B, Table
B.3. The p-values of the likelihood ratio test of the full vs. the intercept-only model
in the second rows of each panel are zero. We therefore conclude that the whole model
is statistically significant.
Let us first consider the model without control variables. As illustrated in the
first column of Table 4.4, estimation results closely correspond to our expectations.
In particular, average subjective life expectancy significantly positively influences the
demand for private pension insurance. Other things being equal, households who expect
to become old, are more likely to purchase supplementary private pension insurance
than those who expect to die young. Quantitatively, the effect seems to be small, but
it is statistically significant at a level of 1.3 percent. Risk averse individuals should
be more willing to insure their longevity risk and thus exhibit a larger likelihood of
having private pension insurance. Correspondingly, the marginal effect of risk aversion
on private pension insurance uptake is positive, but insignificant. Since investment
in pension insurance postpones today’s consumption to tomorrow, individuals with
high time preference should buy private pension insurance less frequently than their
patient counterparts. As expected, a high rate of time preference is associated with
a low predicted probability of having private pension insurance. With a p-value of
0.002, this relationship is highly significant in the model without the vector of control
variables.
Now, let us direct our attention to the model specifications with control variables
in columns two to seven of Table 4.4. Estimation results for this model prove to be
robust across the six specifications. Compared to the model without control variables,
our previous results qualitatively remain stable. As before, the probability of having
private pension insurance significantly increases with average subjective life expectancy.
We therefore conclude that people rationally take expectations about lifetime into
account when deciding about old-age provision. Combined with the predictive power
of subjective expectations of lifetime, this indicates risk-based selection due to private
information. Hence, our investigation of the German annuity market confirms the
commnon finding that annuity markets are in fact characterized by adverse selection.
The impact of risk aversion on pension insurance is again estimated to be insignifi-
cantly positive. Thus, preference-driven selection based on risk aversion does not seem
to play a major role in the annuitization decision. This conflicts the emerging liter-
ature on propitious or advantageous selection based on risk aversion that emphasizes
selection effects driven by risk attitudes instead of riskiness (see Hemenway, 1990;
16Marginal effects can be either evaluated at fixed values of the independent variables, typcially the
means, or averaged over all observations. The first are called marginal effects at the mean (MEM),
while the latter are referred to as average marginal effects (AME). The main argument in favor
of AME is the fact that sample means used during the calculation of MEM might refer to either
nonexistent or nonsensical observations (see Bartus, 2005). For comparison, we also calculated the
MEM which are almost identical to the AME (see Appendix B, Table B.4).
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Meza and Webb, 2001). Besides the admittedly noisy proxy, a potential explanation
is collinearity of risk aversion and subjective life expectancy. This would hold, if risk
aversion increased life expectancy due to more cautious health behavior and if indi-
viduals rationally took this effect into account when building their expectations about
lifetime. Simple cross-correlation analysis as given in Table 4.3, however, throws doubt
on this explanation because the correlation coefficient is close to zero and even slightly
negative. Instead, we attribute insignificance of the marginal effect of risk aversion to
a framing effect (see Brown et al., 2008b). People might view private pension in-
surance policies as a type of investment rather than insurance. Due to its dependency
on the ex ante unknown lifetime, return on investment in private pension insurance
policies is relatively uncertain. In this regard, risk averse people should less frequently
invest in pension insurance. Our result closely corresponds to Brown et al. (2008a)
who use a similar proxy for risk aversion. In most of their specifications, more risk
averse people do not exhibit a significantly higher likelihood of taking annuities in-
stead of a lump-sum payment. In contrast, Cutler et al. (2008) find the expected
relationship between risk-related behaviour and annuitization. Smokers or individuals
with risky jobs are less likely to be covered by annuities, whereas individuals that un-
dertake preventive health activities or those who always wear seatbelts are more likely
to be covered by annuities.
While it is still estimated to be negative, the marginal effect of time preference
on the probability of having private pension insurance becomes insignificant once the
control variables are taken into consideration. Using an analogous proxy for time
preference, Brown et al. (2008a) also does not detect a robust relationship between
time preference and annuity uptake. According to his result, patient individuals tend
to be less likely to prefer the annuity over the lump-sum payment which, however, is
significant at the 10 percent level in only two out of five specifications. We conclude
that the effect is mainly attributed to other characteristics of the household than their
time preference. A possible candidate is financial literacy which seems to play an
outstanding role in the demand for private pension insurance. The probability of having
private pension insurance is about 10 percentage points higher in financially literate
than in financially illiterate households which is significant at the 1 percent level. This
result is in line with the recent literature on the relationship between financial literacy,
retirement planning ability and retirement saving (see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006,
2007a,b; Rooij et al., 2007) and is also supported by Brown et al. (2008a) and
Bucher-Koenen (2009).
Benefit levels from the first pillar proxied by the type of employment also have
substantial explanatory power. As expected, the marginal effect of a self-employed
main earner who is least covered by the public pension system is largest. Thus, pre-
existing annuities tend to crowd out private pension insurance uptake which ought to
be the case according to Mitchell et al. (1999) and Dushi and Webb (2004) and
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is empirically confirmed by Bernheim (1991). According to our results, the predicted
probability also increases with being a worker or a civil servant. There, the marginal
effect of being a civil servant exceeds that of being a worker. At first glance, this seems
counterintuitive due to the relatively more generous benefit levels for civil servants.
An explanation might be a more cautious and provident attitude of civil servants on
average that is not covered by other regressors.
Rather surprisingly, the monetary variables of (equivalent) net wealth, balance in
other insurance-type old-age provision and household income do not determine insur-
ance demand. Wealthy households run a lower risk of depleting their assets before
death so that total wealth is theoretically supposed to negatively impact the probabil-
ity of opting for supplementary private pension insurance. However, in accordance with
Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b), Brown et al. (2008a) and Inkmann et al. (2011),
we do not find this relationship in our data. In a similar manner, other insurance-type
old-age provision can be seen as a substitute to private pension insurance such that
a negative relationship is expected again. However, we again do not see evidence
of substitution between different sources of old-age income. Instead, ahead thinking
households tend to rely on several sources of old-age income. This finding is in line
with other studies that also find a positive relationship between participation in al-
ternative old-age provision and uptake of private pension plans (see Börsch-Supan
et al., 2008b; Inkmann et al., 2011).17 Finally, net (equivalent) household income
also does not seem to play a role in the uptake of private pension insurance. While
Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) estimate a weakly significant positive impact of income
on pension insurance uptake, our result corresponds to Brown et al. (2008a).18
As the average age of its members increases, a household’s probability to purchase
private pension insurance increases, but at a decreasing rate. Aggravating population
aging and raising awareness of decreasing replacement rates of the public pension sys-
tem should lead to a larger probability of supplementary pension insurance in young
households. The youngest households, however, possibly have not yet fully adressed
the matter of old-age provion which explains the observed nonlinearity. Whether the
respondent is married or lives in a partner household, does not seem to influence the
insurance decision. Thus, we do not find evidence for intra-household risk pooling the-
oretically suggested by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). In contrast to Brown and
Poterba (2000) who find higher annuity demand among singles than couples, our
results correspond to Brown et al. (2008a).
Households in Eastern Germany are more likely to purchase private pension in-
17Note, however, that Inkmann et al. (2011) only find this for a subsample of stockholders.
18Presumably, household income is an important determinant of the amount of insurance purchased
because of higher purchasing power and higher standard of living that needs to be insured. In
principal, we could estimate a two-stage model with the amount as the dependent variable in the
second stage. Unfortunately, data on private pension insurance premium in force and contributions
to the scheme prove to be unreliable such that we restrict our attention to the binary variable PPI.
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surance than their Western German counterparts. This might be explained by lower
expected public pension replacement rates of the Eastern German population due to
less continuous employment biographies and lower average income subject to contribu-
tion payments (see Krenz and Nagl, 2009).19 Interestingly, if the number of children
increases by one, the probability of having private pension insurance falls by about
two percentage points. We interpret this statistically significant effect as evidence for
a bequest motive or expected intergenerational transfer from children to their par-
ents during retirement. As mentioned by Bernheim (1991), children’s altruism might
function as a ’safety net’ that makes pension insurance less needed. Our finding cor-
responds to the empirical results by Bernheim (1991). However, quite a number of
studies does not find an empirical indication of bequest motives in old-age provision
(see Hurd, 1987; Brown, 2001; Börsch-Supan et al., 2008b; Brown et al.,
2008a; Inkmann et al., 2011).
19For a detailed income decomposition of the German elderly in the Old and New Laender see Bönke
et al. (2010).
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4.5 Conclusion
We investigate determinants of private pension insurance uptake of German households
using the 2005 SAVE survey on savings and old-age provision. In a comprehensive
assessment of the relevant factors suggested by theory and previous empirical work,
we simultaneously estimate their importance in a multivariate framework. Our main
finding is that households take advantage of private information on expected lifetime
in the pension insurance choice. Conditional on other relevant variables, households
expecting to become old, are relatively more likely to take up supplementary private
pension insurance. This indicates the presence of adverse selection in the German
annuities market.
We also find financial literacy and pre-existing annuities to play a prominent role
in the insurance decision. Financially literate households, identified by their active
participation in the stock market, are significantly more likely to hold private pension
insurance policies. Pre-existing annuities from the quantitatively most important pub-
lic pension system, tend to crowd out private insurance. Civil servants who benefit from
relatively high public pension replacement rates, are less likely to have supplementary
private insurance than households with a self-employed main earner who are typically
not covered by the public system. In addition, the number of children is negatively
related to the probability of private pension insurance. This can be interpreted as an
indication of bequest motives or expected intergenerational altruism. According to our
results, uptake of private pension insurance does not differ between single and partner
households.
In addition, we only find very limited evidence for the theoretically suggested im-
portance of risk aversion and time preference. Our measure of risk aversion has no
explanatory power in the pension insurance choice. This might be explained by the
fact that a pension policy cannot only be seen as insurance, but also as a type of in-
vestment. On the one hand, the insurance character of private pensions that protects
the insurant from longevity risk should be appreciated by risk averse households. On
the other hand, the relatively uncertain return on a pension policy that depends on the
ex ante unknown length of life tends to retain risk averse households from purchase.
These two opposing effects might therefore explain the lacking explanatory power of
our measure of risk aversion. Time preference has the expected negative coefficient,
but it becomes insignificant as control variables are taken into account.
This work contributes to the literature on adverse selection in annuities markets.
Our result is in line with a number of related studies primarily focusing on the UK
and US that also find evidence for adverse selection in annuities markets. While most
of these studies make use of the money’s worth concept to detect adverse selection, we
use micro level data and approach the issue from the perspective of the insurant. To
our knowledge, we are the first to investigate adverse selection in the German annuities
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market at the household level. From the policy point of view, our work suggests that
the private pension insurance market is in fact characterized by inefficiencies related
to adverse selection. Difficulties arise for low risk individuals for whom insurance in
the private pension market is prohibitively expensive. Policy makers should therefore
keep in mind that privately insuring longevity risk is not without difficulty for part of
the population.
For future research, it would be meaningful to conduct a comparable analysis using
panel data that allows to observe household characteristics directly at the time of
annuity purchase. Since our indicators of risk and time preferences are rather rough,
we additionally consider it worthwhile to construct more sophisticated measures of
preferences in surveys. This would provide deeper insight in preference-driven selection
in insurance markets. Finally, it would be interesting to follow the development of the
German pension system and address to adverse selection in Riester pension plans.
While cautiously demanded in the beginning, holding of these increased to about 13
million contracts in end of 2009. Possibly, the design of the subsidy scheme that
strongly incentivizes specific parts of the population to take up Riester plans, outruns
the importance of life expectancy for profitability of the policies and thus reduces
adverse selection.
Part II: Distributive Justice in the German
Support Legislation
Chapter 5
Equity Perceptions Implicit in
German Tax and Transfer Policies:
A Simulation Analysis with Special
Focus on the Support Legislation
5.1 Introduction
The changing pattern of family composition towards single-parent households as well as
the support reform in 20081 placed special emphasis on the topic of support payments in
the political debate in Germany. The reform was in particular aimed at improving child-
welfare, strengthening of post-marital self-responsibility and the legal harmonization
of children born in and out of wedlock (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2006). The
question, to what extent the current support practice provides for distributional justice
between the children’s parents has not been paid much attention to.
In the first part of this study we address this question by revealing the equity
perceptions implicit in the German tax-benefit system. Thereby, we focus on the sup-
port legislation in particular. When comparing the well-being of different households
derived from disposable income, one faces the challenge of taking into account the dif-
ferent needs of heterogeneous households. These can be caused by, among other things,
differences in the number and/or the age of the household members. A conventional
method of relating these needs is the use of equivalence scales. Although the concept of
equivalence scales is widely accepted, it involves an inherent weakness: the choice of a
certain equivalence scale in applied research is a value judgment (see e.g. Cowell and
Mercader-Prats, 1999; Creedy, 2007), since each specification makes statements
on the relative needs. We avoid this criticism of the prevailing equivalence scales by
1‘Law of the Amendment of the Support Legislation’ from 21.12.2007 (Gesetz zur Änderung des
Unterhalts) see Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
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revealing the scales inherent in the German tax-benefit system. Hence, we reverse the
order of reasoning. We evaluate the German spousal and child support legislation by
assuming that horizontal equity is satisfied by the tax-benefit system. That means,
that all household members, formerly living in one and the same household and having
the same standard of living, continue to have the same standard of living after marital
dissolution, even if on a changed level. Since disposable income is determined by vari-
ous subsets of transfer systems, our assumption implies that the interplay of all these
subsets provides for an equalization of both the two newly formed households.2
In order to unveil those implicit scales, we assume the household of the non-custodial
parent (NCP) to be the reference household, and relate the corresponding disposable
income to that of the household of the custodial parent (CP). Hence, it is required
to simulate the disposable income of both of the parents. Therefore, we establish a
simulations model. We choose their pre-tax-pre-transfer incomes3 as starting point.
This procedure enables us to take into account all subsets of the comprehensive tax-
benefit system. This is of importance, since Ebert and Lambert (1999) pointed
out, that an equivalence scale that represents only part of the tax-benefit system is of
limited interest. Hence, our simulation model includes regulations on taxation, social
security and public as well as private transfers, latter in terms of support payments.
Most of the incorporated tax and benefit schemes comprise own equivalence scales.
With the intention to reveal the overall equity perception, it seems essential to us,
to have a closer look on the scales that are inherent in the single subsystems. This
procedure enables us to unveil possible concurred or even opposed value judgments
inherent in the interplay of all subsystems. Therewith, we make an analysis available,
which provides for transparency not only in the comprehensive context, but also in the
parts that comprise the whole. Such an analysis could serve as a basis, which allows
the government to match actual with desired redistribution.
The conducted simulation of the German tax-benefit system can be used, in order
to answer a second policy relevant question concerning the distributive justice of the
support legislation: To what extent do the actual support payments mirror those pay-
ments, alternative equivalence scales would predict? We aim at answering this question
in the second part of this study. Therefore, we take the configuration of the German tax
and public transfer system as given and calculate the corresponding disposable incomes
for both newly formed households. Thus, in a first step we refrain from incorporat-
ing the support legislation. In a second step, the sum of their incomes is distributed
according to different equivalence scales, commonly applied to distributional analy-
2For the sake of simplicity, this assumption is based on one presumption, that is not automatically
assignable to real world value propositions. It is plausible to assume that in case of a subsistence
income or after marital dissolution an equal standard of living is desirable for the concerned house-
holds. However this does not apply to the value judgements discussed with regard to taxation (for
the various principles of taxation see e.g. Kaplow, 2008; Kendrick, 1939).
3In the following also referred to as ‘gross incomes’.
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sis. Finally, predicted support payments are derived by the difference between actual
and artificial disposable incomes of the non-custodial parent or the custodial parent,
respectively.
When analyzing the equity perceptions inherent in the German tax-benefit system,
we refer to two strands in literature. First, we refer to the literature dealing with
equivalence scales inherent in tax-benefit systems. Second, we are concerned with the
literature on the application of equity to support payments.
There exist some studies deriving implicit equivalence scales in order to analyze
the current tax-benefit systems. Muellbauer and Ven (2002, 2004) focus on the
methodology of estimating implicit equivalence scales within the tax-benefit systems.
Additionally, Muellbauer and Ven (2002) contrast their derived scale for the Aus-
tralian tax-benefit system with an officially applied scale and find a relatively good fit.
Ayala et al. (2003) investigate those equivalence scales, implicit in the Personal In-
come Tax in Spain. Thereby, they only refer to scales corresponding to minimal needs.
They contrast these minimal income scales to scales, commonly used in distribution
analyses. Their comparative results show that scales referring to the minimal income,
on average, exhibit higher values when inherent in the Spanish tax system. Hence, in
practice economies of scale are taken into account to a lesser extent than in distribu-
tion analyses. The study of Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) refers to Germany and
investigates distributional justice, defined as an identical average tax-benefit burden,
embodied in the German tax-benefit system. Two different equivalence scales, inherent
in the German system are employed. Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) refer to a sys-
tem, which comprises taxes, social security contributions and public transfers, latter in
the form of the German unemployment benefit II. Their results show, that the German
legislation represents significant contradictions in value judgments between the three
single systems under investigation.
Literature on the application of equity to support payments is extremely rare. The
existing literature focuses on child support only, hence disregards spousal support.
Eden et al. (1987) were the first, who urged to the goal of an equalization of living
standards within the framework of child support payments. They proposed a model
that provides for an equal standard of living by pooling the parent’s incomes and real-
locating them according to regulations associated with the federal poverty guideline.4
Braver and Stockburger (2004) refer to the standard of living approach, even if
they apply a given equivalence scales in order to determine the equivalent incomes
of the custodial parent for given levels of gross income of the non-custodial parent.
While the concept of horizontal equity was originally applied to taxation, Sorensen
and Halpern (2000) point to the fact that inconsistencies in judicial awards should
also be an issue of horizontal equity. Thereby horizontal equity is defined as the equal
treatment of equals. Farr and Buurman (2003) take up their definition of horizontal
4For a sample calculation see Rowe (1989).
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equity and investigate horizontal and vertical equity5 within the framework of child
support for Australia. Therefore, they simulate a model indicating the amounts each
parent has to contribute to the costs of the children and relate those amounts to the
levels dedicated by the equity principles. For both cases, they find that the Australian
child support regulations treat the custodial parent more favourable than the non-
custodial parent. Only in the case the custodial parent draws a relatively high income,
vertical equity is approximately fulfilled.
To our knowledge the German support legislation has not been investigated yet
on the principle of horizontal equity. With this study, in which we use two different
– but methodologically similar – approaches to reveal the implicit value judgments
within the German support legislation, we connect both above mentioned strands of
the literature. Hence, we contribute to the literature by applying the concept of implicit
equivalence scales to the topic of distributional equity in the context of regulations on
support. In contrast to the first strand, we extend the tax-benefit system to private
transfers, those in the form of support payments. With respect to the literature on the
application of equity to the support legislation, we contrast by relying on implicit scales
instead of given ones, like done by Braver and Stockburger (2004). Additionally,
we integrate not only child support, but also spousal support payments.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: In Section 5.2 the concept of equiva-
lence scales and the most prominent procedures of deriving them are introduced. In
particular, those scales, adapted to this study, are amplified. Section 5.3 presents
the German tax-benefit system and illustrates how the simulated data is gathered.
Section 5.4 deduces the scales implicit in single provisions of the German tax-benefit
system. Subsequently, the inherent scale of the whole tax-benefit system is derived
and comparisons to the single scales as well as to commonly used scales are made.
The results concerning differences between the actual and predicted support payments
are presented in Section 5.5. Conclusively, Section 5.6 summarizes and presents policy
implications.
5Farr and Buurman (2003) define ‘vertical equity’ as the principle, that people with a greater ability
to pay should do so.
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5.2 Methodological Concepts
To analyze the equity perceptions implicit in the German tax-benefit system it is
essential to provide a definition of ‘equity’ in the context of this study. Subsequently,
we associate the definition of equity with the core instrument of our analysis, the
equivalence scales. In this framework we introduce the property of base (in)dependence
and the most prominent procedures of deriving equivalence scales. Finally, we amplify
those scales, adapted to the analysis.
5.2.1 Horizonal Equity and Equivalence Scales
When investigating distributional justice in the German tax-benefit system we refer
to the definition of horizontal equity as stated by Feldstein (1976). Thereafter,
redistribution should be organized in a way that the ranking of utility levels remains
unchanged. Hence, referring to our case of marital dissolution, we assume one and the
same standard of living for all household members before divorce. By assuming that
the German tax-benefit satisfies horizontal equity, we proceed on the assumption that
after divorce both newly formed households still realize an idendical standard of living,
even if on a changed level.
Our measure of equity perceptions implicit in tax-benefit systems are equivalence
scales. Intuitively, equivalence scales mirror the relatives in requirements necessary
to attain one and the same standard of living. But at first, consider the ‘classic’
perspective on equivalence scales and reverse the reasoning: Equivalence scales allow
comparing the material comfort of different household types. Thereby, an identical ma-
terial comfort, or identical standard of living, is defined by an equivalent income.6 The
determination of equivalent incomes is done by means of equivalence scales. The idea
behind the concept of equivalence scales is the following: Requirements of a household
increase with the number of household members but simultaneously, due to joint house-
keeping, economies of scale can be realized (see Donaldson and Pendakur, 1999).
Hence, total requirements increase less than the number of household members. Equiv-
alence scales assign to each household member those additional requirements, needed
to keep the household on a constant standard of living. For this reason, equivalence
scales can be regarded as deflators of the household income echoing certain household
characteristics.
Let us assume two households r and h (i = r, h). Both differ concerning their
income, µi, and their household characteristics, zi, as for instance number and age of
the household members. In the basic case, household r consists of one adult and is
assumed to be the reference household. Now, we are interested in the income µh, that
6The formal notation interprets an identical material comfort as an identical indirect utility level
of different household types (see e.g. Bradbury, 1989; Coulter et al., 1992b; Cowell and
Mercader-Prats, 1999).
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grants its members a standard of living equal to that of the single household r, which
draws an income of µr. Thereby, the household characteristics of household h, zh, have
to be taken into consideration. This can formally written as:
E(µh, zh) = µr , (5.1)
whereas E(µh, zh) is denoted as the equivalent income function. The equivalent income
is, thus, defined here as the income the reference household needs in order to attain
the same standard of living as household h with income µh.
As equivalence scales, mi, are deflators of the income, the formal link between
equivalent income, E(µh, zh), and actual income, µh, of household h can be formulated
by means of the equivalence scale, mh, as:
E(µh, zh) =
µh
m(zh)
⇔ m(zh) = µh
E(µh, zh)
. (5.2)
Combining Equation 5.1 and Equation 5.2 displays equivalence scale m(zh) as relation
of actual incomes of households differing in income and household characteristics, and
illustrates the above mentioned intuitive perspective on equivalence scales:
m(zh) =
µh
µr
. (5.3)
A question discussed in the literature, is whether equivalence scales are allowed to
be independent of base7 or not. Hence, it is discussed whether scales are allowed to
vary with the income of the reference household or not.8 Equation 5.2 displays a scale
independent of base, whereas scales dependent on base can, for example, be written
as:
E(µh, zh) = µh − Ω(zh) = µh
m(µh, zh)
. (5.4)
Thereby, Ω denotes the basic needs as a function of the household characteristics zh
(see Bönke and Eichfelder, 2010).
5.2.2 Types of Equivalence Scales
A variety of equivalence scales is discussed in the literature. Concerning the method-
ology of derivation, they can be classified into three different groups: (a) expert based,
(b) demand based, and (c) survey based scales.9
7The terminology of Independence of Base goes back to Lewbel (1989) and is also named as Equiv-
alence Scale Exactness (see e.g. Blackorby and Donaldson, 1993).
8See e.g. Blackorby and Donaldson (1993); Blundell and Lewbel (1991); Conniffe (1992);
Donaldson and Pendakur (2004); Koulovatianos et al. (2005);Muellbauer and Ven (2002,
2004); Pendakur (1998).
9For an overview of different equivalence scales see e.g.Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999); Nel-
son (1993). For an overview of the classification of scales see e.g.Coulter et al. (1992a); Faik
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Most of the scales applied in empirical work on distributional topics are based on
statements of experts on specific minimal needs of households. These statements are,
however, arbitrary even if they are based on an empirical basis. The reference point
of those scales is the subsistence level of the corresponding household types.10 The
ideas behind the expert approach are manifold11, but all in common is that the weights
assigned to additional household members are shares of the requirements of the first
person in the household.
The demand based approach aims at deriving equivalence scales on the basis of
observed consumer behaviour. Single-equation models identify different household
types to exhibit the same standard of living by means of the same share (see En-
gel, 1895) or the same absolute amount (see Rothbarth, 1943) of income spent on
food. Multi-equation models extend the single-equation models on product-specific
scales (see Barten, 1964; Prais and Houthakker, 1955).
A further method of deriving equivalence scales is based on revealing subjective
perceptions on an equal material comfort with the assistance of interviews and sur-
veys.12 In the literature there exist two competing approaches, the consensual and
the subjective approach. The decisive difference consists in the household types about
which respondents have to give judgements. Within the framework of the consensual
approach, the respondent has to give judgements on the relation between financial re-
sources and material comfort about different household types. Within the framework
of the subjective approach the respondent only assesses her own household type.13
Irrespective of the methodology, Buhmann et al. (1988) established that all types
of scales can be expressed in a parametric form. The first and most straightforward
of these parametric scales goes back to the article of Buhmann et al. (1988). Their
scale is characterized by one parameter φ, the equivalence elasticity, indicating the
economies of scale of joint housekeeping:
m(s, φ) = sφ with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, (5.5)
where s denotes the number of household members. Economies of scale are the higher
the smaller φ. In order to account for the differences in needs between adults and
minors, as pointed out by McClements (1977), the basis parametric form was ex-
tended by e.g. Banks and Johnson (1994); Coulter and Katz (1992); Jenkins
and Cowell (1994) to the following formula:
m(a, c, η, φ) = (a+ ηc)φ with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, (5.6)
(1995); Schröder (2004, 2009).
10The pioneering work goes back to Engel (1895); Orshansky (1965); Rowntree (1901).
11For an overview see Coulter et al. (1992a).
12The pioneering work goes back to Kapteyn and Praag (1978) and Praag (1971).
13For further details on the different scales see Coulter et al. (1992a), Faik (1995) and Schröder
(2004).
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where a denotes the number of adults and c the number of children. The parameter η
provides for the adjustment in terms of lower needs of children and φ, as stated above,
considers the correction with respect economies of scale.
5.2.3 Equivalent Scales Employed in this Study
In our study we contrast the revealed implicit scales with commonly used ones in
order to have reference points of equity perceptions discussed in the literature. As
already mentioned, there exists no consensus on the ‘correct’ scale. Following Buh-
mann et al. (1988), all the scales have equivalence elasticities ranking between 0.2
(survey scales) and 0.8 (expert scales). To cover different assumptions on the extent of
economies of scale, to take into account differences in needs between adults and minors
and to consider scales dependent as well as independent on base, we decide to consider
four scales in our investigation: (a,b) both OECD scales,14 (c) a scale recommended by
Citro and Michael (1995), an US expert commission,15 and (d) a scale of Koulo-
vatianos et al. (2009).16 The first three scales (a–c) can be assigned to the class of
expert based scales, whereas the KSS scales belongs to the consensual approach of the
survey based scales.17
The three expert based scales are commonly used in distribution and poverty anal-
yses. For Germany, the two OECD scales are usually applied (see e.g. Deutscher
Bundestag, 2001, 2005, 2008). For the United States, the scale recommended by
Citro and Michael (1995) is frequently used (see e.g. Braver and Stockburger,
2004). Whereas the OECD scales only account for the differences in needs between
adults and minors, Citro and Michael (1995) in addition consider a parameter ac-
counting for economies of scale.
The functional notation of the OECD scales is as follows:
m(a, c, α, β) = 1 + (α(a− 1) + βc) , (5.7)
where a denotes the number of adults, c the number of children, and α and β denote
the relative requirements of additional adults18 or of the children. The old-OECD scale
sets α = 0.7 and β = 0.5. Thus, it allocates to the first person in the household a value
of 1, each further adult in the household is allocated an additional requirement of 70%
and each child an additional requirement of 50% of the first person (see OECD, 1982).
The modified-OECD scale sets α = 0.5 and β = 0.3 (see Hagenaars et al., 1994).
14In the following referred to as old-OECD scale or rather modified-OECD scale.
15In the following referred to as Citro scale.
16In the following referred to as KSS scale.
17We do not refer to scales based on consumer demand behaviour, as the four selected scales represent
the all above mentioned main features of equivalence scales. Additionally, in comparison to expert
based scales the demand based scales are less frequently used in applied analysis.
18‘Additional’ means additional to the first person in the household.
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Hence, with setting smaller values the modified-OECD scale implicitly assumes higher
economies of scale.
As mentioned above, the functional notation of the Citro scale is characterized by
an additional parameter, φ, explicitly accounting for economies of scale:
m(a, c, β, φ) = (a+ βc)φ . (5.8)
Each adult is assigned an identical requirement of 1, each child is allocated a weight of
β = 0.7 and the expert commission recommends an equivalence elasticity ranking be-
tween φ = 0.65 and φ = 0.75 (see Citro andMichael, 1995). We follow Braver and
Stockburger (2004) in assuming a value φ = 0.7, the average of recommendation.
Additionally, we refer to a survey based scale of Koulovatianos et al. (2009),
henceforth KSS Scale. The difference of the latter scale to the further ones is based on
two of its properties: (a) it is dependent on base and (b) it allows for differences in the
employment status of the adults in the household. Thus, it seems to be particularly
suitable for our research purpose. Since the scale distinguishes between the employment
status of the adults, we are enabled to quantify the differences in well-being caused by
the loss of household production and the harm associated with employment. This is
in particular useful for the analysis of support payments, as it is to be expected that
labor market participation of the non-custodial parent and the custodial parent fall
apart. A further advantage of the KSS scale is that the scale is deduced from a survey
conducted in Germany.
5.2 Methodological Concepts 83
Table 5.1: Survey referring to Koulovatianos et al. (2009)
Incomes have to be 2 adults, 2 adults,
stated that way, that 1 adult, 1 adult, 2 adults, 1 nonworking both
all household types nonworking working both 1 working working
realize the same full time nonworking full time full time
standard of living
0 children 500e*
1 child
2 children
3 children
Note: *Exemplary declaration on the monthly disposable income of the reference household.
Each respondent have been presented three different surveys with differing reference
incomes, 500e, 2,000e and 3,500e.
Source: Koulovatianos et al. (2009, S. 51).
The subjective equivalence scales derived by this survey are associated to the con-
sensual approach. Thus, the respondents were asked to give statements on identical
standards of living for different household types. In this specific case three surveys
were presented to each of the respondents. The three surveys exclusively differed con-
cerning the level of income of the reference household, an unemployed single. They
displayed monthly disposable incomes of 500e, 2,000e and 3,500e, respectively. The
survey design is shown in Table 5.1. The surveys had to be processed in ascending
order of reference income. Thereby, the respondents were asked to fill the blank boxes
with those monthly disposable incomes, that enable – to the respondents opinion –
the corresponding household types to realize the same standard of living as the unem-
ployed single, equipped with the stated reference income. Hence, they were asked to
give statements to equivalent incomes.
Table 5.2 displays the results of the surveys conducted by Koulovatianos et al.
(2009). N and W denote the employment status of the adults. Each N points to a
nonworking adult, each W to an adult in employment (full time) and each C to a child
in the household. The results can be exemplified as follows: Assuming the unemployed
single has an income of 2,000e at disposal, then a working (nonworking) single living
in a household with two children would need an income of 3,700.30e (2,812.20e) to
realize the same standard of living that the reference household provides.
According to Equation 5.3 equivalence scales can be derived by relating income
levels of different household types to each other. KSS scales comparable to our investi-
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Table 5.2: Equivalent incomes referring to Koulovatianos et al. (2009)
Singles Couples
yr N W N/N W/N W/W
500
No 500 903.35 977.13 1,314.33 1,715.85Children (21.66) (18.63) (33.50) (53.18)
C 802.13 1,227.90 1,266.10 1,603.96 2,070.58(8.43) (25.65) (20.52) (36.27) (55.63)
CC 1,073.41 1,498.63 1,522.38 1,866.16 2,371.19(16.59) (31.90) (27.41) (4.36) (61.40)
CCC 1,323.05 1,758.69 1,747.35 2,102.74 2,645.58(26.58) (40.93) (34.96) (52.20) (70.85)
2,000
No 2,000 2,829.57 3,227.29 3,856.16 4,718.60Children (67.48) (57.10) (89.18) (147.11)
C 2,460.37 3,308.08 3,628.81 4,287.35 5,249.54(36.42) (82.82) (78.24) (109.57) (168.85)
CC 2,812,20 3,700.30 3,960.06 4,622.41 5,660.76(56.29) (98.11) (91.18) (119.55) (181.48)
CCC 3,149.39 4,066.74 4,297.53 4,969.21 6,092.07(78.51) (117.10) (116.45) (139.19) (203.18)
3,500
No 3,500 4,540.70 5,277.44 6,135.82 7,432.32Children (94.02) (92.51) (139.01) (228.72)
C 3,980.95 5,104.73 5,752.10 6,695.43 8,077.59(31.45) (105.89) (108.92) (157.54) (246.22)
CC 4,410.34 5,576.07 6,175.15 7,141.49 8,592.84(63.10) (124.63) (128.12) (177.50) (265.15)
CCC 4,815.52 6,028.02 6,594.02 7,582.62 9,100.91(94.54) (148.12) (155.18) (201.16) (285.35)
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. yr Level of reference income in e. Each N points
to a nonworking adult, each W to an adult in work and each C for a child.
Source: Koulovatianos et al. (2009, S. 45)
gation relate disposable income of single-parent households (with one to three children)
to disposable income of a single household. Thereby the single household is chosen to
be the reference household. As in our investigation we assume that the non-custodial
parent is in employment and lives in a single household,19 the single household in em-
ployment is chosen to be the reference household. Thus, when deriving those KSS
scales applicable to our scenarios, we refer to Table 5.3 and only make use of the two
columns entitled with ‘Singles’. For each of the three household types of the custodial
parent (one, two and three children) we determine three equivalence scales, one for
each reference income. Comparing the equivalence scales for one and the same cus-
todial parent household type (one to three children) at the three reference points, we
observe a decrease in the scale associated with an increase in income of the reference
household. This relation holds for all household types.
To visualize the KSS scale, we estimate the non-linear relationship between equiv-
alence scale and disposable income for each household type. Thereby, we distinguish
19For details on the investigated scenarios see Section 5.3.1.
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between the employment status of the custodial parent. To make the scales applicable
to subsequent analyses,20 we process the gathered data shown in Table 5.2 in two man-
ners. First, we adjust the data to prices of 2010. Second, we conclude form the stated
disposable income to pre-tax-pre-transfer income with the help of the simulation model
outlined in this study.21
Figure 5.1 illustrates the derived KSS scales. Subfigure (a) displays the case of a
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(b) NCP & CP work
Figure 5.1: KSS scale: NCP & CP work
non-custodial parent in employment and a corresponding unemployed custodial parent,
in subfigure (b) both, the non-custodial parent as well as the custodial parent are in
employment. Both figures have three characteristics, worth mentioning, in common:
First, as to be expected, the higher the number of children in the household of the
custodial parent the higher is the associated equivalence scale. Second, the KSS scale
is income dependent as all the scales show a decreasing slope. Third, with increasing
income the scales converge. A comparison of the subfigures illustrates, that the esti-
mated equivalence scales of case (a) show lower levels than those of case (b). Hence, the
requirements awarded to the household of an unemployed custodial parent in relation
to a non-custodial parent in employment are lower than those awarded to the household
of a custodial parent in employment. We interpret this finding as a compensation of
the non-custodial parent for the loss of household production and the harm associated
with employment.
Table 5.3 provides an overview of all equivalence scales employed in this study. As
our study is focused on the equivalent incomes of single-parent families in relation to
singles, the table exclusively displays scales for different single-parent household types.
The first column describes the household type of the custodial parent. The A indicates,
that there is only one adult in the household and the number of stated Cs indicates
20Subsequent analyses base on pre-tax-pre-transfer income, also understood as gross wage (see Section
5.3).
21For further details on the simulation model see Section 5.3.
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the corresponding number of dependent children.22 From the table can be gathered
that we refer to both, income dependent and income independent scales. The scales
of the latter category are entitled as ‘deflators’. In contrast, the term ‘max. deflator’
points to the income dependence of the scale. Stated values refer to the lowest reference
income of Koulovatianos et al. (2009).
The figures in the table can be exemplified as follows: According to the modified-
OECD scale, a household comprising one adult and two children has requirements
1.6-times as high as that of a single, so as to realize the same standard of living.
Referring to the KSS scale two distinctions have to be made. First, the scales vary
with the employment status of the custodial parent. As an example, in the case that
the custodial parent is in employment, the maximum deflators resemble those of the
modified-OECD scale rather well. A custodial parent with two children has e.g. re-
quirements 1.659-times as high as that of a single. The maximum deflator reduces to
requirements of 1.188-times in the case the custodial parent is unemployed. Second,
the stated maximum deflators only refer to the reference income of 903.35e.23 As
the KSS scale is income dependent, the equivalence scales decrease with in increase in
income.
22We assume that the children are aged between 6 and 11 years (see Section 5.3.1). Hence, as the
children are minors we only account for one adult in the household of the custodial parent.
23This amount relates to 2003, adjusted to 2010 it equals an disposble income of 977.42e and estimated
to pre-tax-pre-transfer annual income it equals to 16,613.32e.
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5.3 The Simulation Model of the German Tax-Benefit
System
This section presents the simulation model used to calculate the post-tax-post-transfer
incomes of our simulated data. The section begins with an introduction to the simu-
lated population and to the scenarios under investigation. Subsequently, the features
of the different subsystems of the German tax-benefit system, incorporated in the sim-
ulation model, are introduced.
5.3.1 Simulated Data and Scenarios
We generate a synthetic population that comprises various combinations of separately
living families. For each of these families we consider two households, the household of
the non-custodial parent and the one of the custodial parent. Thereby the latter lives
with one up to three dependent children. Hence, our population exclusively consists
of single adults and single-parents with one up to three children.24 Our analysis is
conducted for varying annual gross incomes of both households. Thereby, three pe-
culiarities are worth noting: First, in any of the cases the non-custodial parent is in
employment and draws a pre-tax-pre-transfer annual income of at least 15,600e rising
up to 117,600e.25 Second, the corresponding custodial parent draws a pre-tax-pre-
transfer annual income varying between 0e and 117,600e.26 Third, the non-custodial
parent draws an income at least as high as that of the corresponding custodial parent.
In total, our synthetic population consists of 207 different income combinations of non-
custodial and custodial parent, whereas for each combination the number of dependent
children varies from one to three. Hence, given the number of income combinations
and the number of children, our total sample comprises 621 observations. For each of
these observations we investigate two different scenarios: (a) the non-custodial parent
is liable for ‘child support only’ and (b) the non-custodial parent is liable for ‘child and
spousal support’.27
5.3.2 Tax System and Social Security Contributions
As a first step in transforming pre-tax-pre-transfer income into post-tax-post-transfer
income, we calculate the aggregate burden of taxes and social security contributions
in order to determine post-tax-pre-transfer income minus expenses for social security
contributions. Therefore, we assume pre-tax-pre-transfer income as gross wage and
24We assume that all children in a household are aged between 6 and 11 years. It is necessary to make
an assumption on the childrens age since in the German legislation stated requirements depend on
the childrens age.
25The rise proceeds in increments of 6,000e.
26The first increment amounts to 9,600e, the further rise proceeds in increments of 6,000e.
27For a justification of these two scenarios see Section 5.3.4.
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calculate taxable income according to §39b GTC (German Tax Code), at first. Subse-
quently, income tax, supplementary taxes (Zuschlagssteuern) as well as social security
contributions for employees are determined. As all households in our simulated dataset
are separated they are assessed separately for tax.
Taxable income is computed by deducting the following allowances and exemptions
from gross wage: (a) work related standard tax deduction (Arbeitnehmerpauschbetrag),
(b) blanket allowance for special expenses (Sonderausgabenpauschbetrag) and (c) provi-
sional lump sum (Vorsorgepauschale). Tax exemption for dependent children (Kinder-
freibetrag) is considered if it is more advantageous than the receipt of child allowance
(Kindergeld).28 Furthermore, in the case of custodial parents, we take single-parent
lump sum (Alleinerziehendenentlastung) into account.29 In order to calculate income
tax we apply the income tax rate (Einkommenssteuertarif ) according to §32a GTC.30
Referring to supplementary taxes, we consider the solitary surcharge (Solidarität-
szuschlag) only. Hence, we follow Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) and disregard
church tax (Kirchensteuer). Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) interpret church tax as
a voluntary donation. The solitary surcharge amounts to 5.5% of income tax subject
to tax exemption for dependent children. In our simulation we also take the exemption
limit (Freigrenze) and the transition section (Übergangsbereich) into consideration.31
In determining social security contributions it is essential to make some further
assumptions on the synthetic population. All the employees are subject to social in-
surance contributions and are located in the western part of Germany. Concerning
the statutory health insurance (SHI), we assume an insurer, not charging supplemental
contributions.32
5.3.3 Public Transfers: Basic Security for Unemployed
A household qualifies for transfers according to German Social Code II (GSC II) if
its post-tax income, deducting expenses for social security contributions, falls below of
the unemployment benefit II (UEB II), entitled to the corresponding household type.33
To those households we assign, as post-tax-pre-private-transfer income, an amount
corresponding to the UEB II. For its calculation we comprise regular and supplemental
payments (Regel- und Mehrbedarf ) according to §§20 and 21 GSC II as well as costs
for housing and heating. Latter we estimate referring to the average actual reimbursed
28We disregard the devolution of the tax exemption for dependent children to the non-custodial parent,
as §32 subp. 6 sent. 6 GTC does not allow for devolution by default.
29For details on the allowances see Appendix C, Tables C.1 and C.2.
30For details on the income tax rate see Appendix C, Table C.3.
31For details see Appendix C, Table C.4.
32For details see Appendix C, Table C.5.
33For reasons of clarity, we disregard those unemployment benefits resulting form unemployment
insurance, the so-called unemployment benefit I.
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costs in the city of Berlin.34 In case the concerned household is in employment we raise
its disposable income according to §11b GSC II.
5.3.4 Private Transfers: Support Legislation
The German support legislation is established in the German Civil Code (GCC) and
distinguishes between spousal (§§1569–1586b GCC) and child support (§§1601–1615n
GCC). With coming into effect of the ‘Law of the Amendment of the Support Leg-
islation’, regulations on spousal benefits sharpened. Primarily, each of the divorced
spouses is constrained to account for its own maintenance (§1569 GCC), hence claims
for spousal support only remain in some exceptional cases (see §§1570–1573 and 1576
GCC) and apply to the first years after marital dissolution. Child support, in contrast,
is strengthened by the above mentioned law as differences concerning the legal claims
of children born in and out of wedlock have been removed. Additionally, the order of
priority changed in favour of the children as liabilities against children is given priority
to those of all other relatives. Because of these differences in law between child and
spousal support, we decide to conduct our analysis for two cases: (a) the case ‘child
support only’ and (b) the case of joint ‘child and spousal support’. Hence, we disregard
the third conceivable case ‘spousal support only’.
The legal text on itself only provides statutory provisions on the normative level of
‘reasonable’ support payments (§§1578 and 1610 GCC) as well as provisions on the min-
imum requirements a dependent child is allowed to claim from the non-custodial parent
(§1612a GCC). The precise regulations on support payments entering our simulation
model are ruled by the Düsseldorfer Table.35 In order to understand our procedure of
simulating German support guidelines and to evaluate the outcomes, it is essential to
introduce the German support practice in more detail.
The eponymous core of the German guideline for support payments is indeed a
table (see Table 5.4), regulating child support. Figures stated in the table are monthly
amounts on the requirements of a dependent child. Amounts vary with the child’s age
and with the ‘adjusted net income’ (bereinigtes Nettoeinkommen) of the non-custodial
parent. For reasons of simplification and clarity, we assign to all the children in our
synthetic dataset a middle age between 6 and 11 years. Adjusted net income is cal-
culated by deducting net income by occupational expenditures, following Remark A3
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2011). However, the payable amount cannot
be gathered from the table directly. To determine the actual payable amount three
34We assume that this is a good predictor for average actual reimbursement, since the rent index in
Berlin ranks in the German midfield. Additionally, we calculated average reimbursed costs for the
city of Kiel, likewise a city with an average rent index, and come to similar results. For a detailed
overview see Appendix C, Table C.6.
35The Düsseldorfer Table is the German guideline on support payments established in 1962 and
adjusted in a two-year cycle. It is divided in five sections (A to E), whereas the first (Section A)
rules child support and the second (Section B) spousal support.
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Table 5.4: Düsseldorfer Table
Income Net Income Age Group in Years Percentage Amount to CheckClass of NCP (§ 1612a GCC) NCP’s Requirements
0-5 6-11 12-17 from 18
All Amounts in Euro
1. up to 1,500 317 364 426 488 100 770/950
2. 1,501-1,900 333 383 448 513 105 1,050
3. 1,901-2,300 349 401 469 537 110 1,150
4. 2,301-2,700 365 419 490 562 115 1,250
5. 2,701-3,100 381 437 512 586 120 1,350
6. 3,101-3,500 406 466 546 625 128 1,450
7. 3,501-3,900 432 496 580 664 136 1,550
8. 3,901-4,300 457 525 614 703 144 1,650
9. 4,301-4,700 482 554 648 742 152 1,750
10. 4,701-5,100 508 583 682 781 160 1,850
starting from 5,101 according to context of the certain case
Source: Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2011).
aspects have to be taken into account: (a) the number of entitled persons, (b) the
offsetting of child allowance, and (c) non-custodial parent’s personal requirements.
By default, the Düsseldorfer Table assumes two entitled persons.36 In case of a
lower (higher) number, surcharges (deductions) have to be done. These corrections
are realized by up- (down-)grading the non-custodial parent’s income class. As an
example, the non-custodial parent draws an adjusted net income of 2,450e and is
liable for maintenance against one child of 10 years. According to his income, he
is classified to the forth income class. Since he is liable for one person, he is to be
upgraded to the fifth class and, as a consequence, the child’s requirements rise form
419e to 437e.
A further deviation of stated amount and amount actual payable is caused by the
offsetting of child allowance. According to §1612b GCC child allowance is to be used
to cover the child’s requirements, half the allowance for minor children and the full
allowance for adult children. As all the children in our dataset are minors and, as we
assign the child allowance to the custodial parent, the non-custodial parent is allowed to
diminish the stated amount by half of the monthly child allowance. At present,37 child
allowance amounts to 184e for the first two children each, to 190e for the third and to
215e for each further child (§66 GTC). Concerning the above mentioned scenario, this
implicates a reduction of 92e and the non-custodial parent has to pay 345e instead
of 437e.
The last column of the Düsseldorfer Table undertakes the task to preserve necessary
personal requirements (notwendiger Eigenbedarf ) to the non-custodial parent, or rather
36The Düsseldorfer Table assumes two children or one child and a former marital partner (see Remark
A1 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2011).
37Effective: July 2011.
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to provide for a balanced budget (Bedarfskontrollbetrag) between the entitled children
and the non-custodial parent.38 If remaining income – after payment of all child support
liabilities – falls below the stated amount of the last column for the income class the
non-custodial parent belongs to, the non-custodial parent has to be downgraded to a
lower income class. The non-custodial parent has to be downgraded to that income
class, the amount is not undercut anymore. In case the necessary requirements could
not cover even in the first income class, a deficiency calculation (Mangelfallberechnung)
is conducted following Section C Düsseldorfer Table.
In case, we investigate the combination ‘child and spousal support’, we also rely
our simulation model on Section B Düsseldorfer Table. According to our assumptions
on the employment status of the non-custodial and the custodial parent as well as
due to the fact that in both scenarios the non-custodial parent has liabilities against
children, our simulation is exclusively concerned with Remarks I.1.a) and b), III. and
IV. of Section B. Two aspects are worth noting. First, the reform of 2008 changed the
order of priority in favour of the children (§1609 GCC), hence the payment liability
against the former marital partner is determined on the basis of the non-custodial
parent’s remaining income – remaining after payment of child support (see Remark
III., Section B Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2011). Second, although child
support overrides spousal support, child claims are directly affected by spousal support
as the number of entitled persons rises and non-custodial parent is downgraded with
respect to his income class.
Spousal support is calculated according to Remark I.1.a) and b), Section B Ober-
landesgericht Düsseldorf (2011). Thus, spousal support rates amount to 3
7
of
the difference between remaining income of the non-custodial parent and adjusted net
income of the custodial parent. Nevertheless, spousal support equals to zero in two
cases: (a) adjusted net income of the custodial parent exceeds the remaining income
of the non-custodial parent and (b) a deficiency calculation has been conducted in the
context of determining the child support payment. In comparison to the child support
regulations, the non-custodial parent has constant necessary personal requirements of
1,050e towards the entitled former marital partner (see Remark IV., Section B Ober-
landesgericht Düsseldorf, 2011). If the non-custodial parent’s remaining income
– after the payment of all liabilities – falls below this amount, spousal support amounts
to the difference between the remaining income of the non-custodial parent – after the
payment of child liabilities – and 1,050e.
Finally, it is essential to spend some words on our determination of disposable in-
come of the custodial parent in the case the custodial parent qualifies for UEB II.
38The former refers to the first income class, the latter to all further ones. In case of the first
income class a distinction is made concerning the employment status of the non-custodial parent. A
minimum personal requirement of 770e is allocated to an unemployed non-custodial parent. As we
assume that the non-custodial parent is in employment (see Section 5.3.1), in the simulation model
we refer to the amount of 950e.
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Many additional income sources additional to UEB II are allowable on UEB II (§11
GTC), so as e.g. returns on support claims and child allowances. As a consequence,
disposable income of the concerned households does not necessarily increase with the
receipt of support payments. In our simulation model we test whether the sum of child
allowance and support exceeds the minimum requirements stated by legislation. We
do this for each single household member of the custodial parent household. For those
household members for whom the sum of child allowance and support claims exceeds
the minimum requirements, it is advantageous to quit the household community (Be-
darfsgemeinschaft) formally. For those members UEB II is shortened, in return, the
whole support associated to the corresponding household member, can be added to
disposable income. In the case, that it is not advantageous to quit the community,
we follow Bundessozialgericht (2009) and add an additional amount of 30e to
disposable income for each member remaining in the community.
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5.4 Results: Equivalence Scales Implicit in the Ger-
man Tax-Benefit System
This section presents the results to the question, which equity perceptions are inherent
in the German tax-benefit system. At first, we present selected scales inherent in
single subsystems. Subsequently, those scales arising through the interplay of the
comprehensive tax-benefit system are revealed. We conclude with a comparative look
at the derived scales and those commonly used in distributional analyses.
5.4.1 Single Value Judgements in the German Tax-Benefit Sys-
tem
Considering the whole German tax-benefit system, one can find a wide range of value
judgements implemented by the legislation. In order to unveil those judgements, they
could be transformed into implicit equivalence scales. Many of the value judgements
pertain to the bottom tail of the income distribution, others can be applied to the
whole income distribution and still others only pertain to selected groups of society, so
as to the group of marital dissolved.
We decided to subject three implicit scales into further analysis: (a) The ‘unemploy-
ment scale’ refers to the minimal needs of unemployed households, (b) the ‘tax scale’
refers to the German Income Tax Law and (c) the ‘support scale’ relates to the value
judgements implicit in the German Support Legislation. This approach enables us to
cover a broad array of applications. Despite the contentswise covering of employed and
unemployed households, different properties of equivalent scales are taken into consid-
eration. Whereas the unemployment scale is a representative for a scale independent
of base, both further ones belong to the class of income dependent equivalence scales.
Concerning the unemployment scale, we refer to the subsistence level according to
Deutscher Bundestag (2011). For the calculation, we comprise regular and sup-
plemental payments, assessed costs for housing and heating and the children’s needs
for education and social participation. Thereby, we refer to the relevant paragraphs of
the German Social Code II (GSC II) and the corresponding sections of Deutscher
Bundestag (2011). Following those regulations, we calculate an average annual sub-
sistence level of 7,728e for a single adult.39 The corresponding implicit equivalence
scales are displayed in the second column of Table 5.5.
To analyze the value judgements imposed by the German tax system, we make
use of the stated annual allowances. Each adult gets a basic allowance of 8,008e
(see §32a GTC), the child allowance amounts to 7,008e (see §32 subp. 6 GTC)40
39For detailed information on the calculation of the average subsistence level see Appendix C, Table
C.7.
40Child allowance consists of two components, an allowance for the subsistence level (4,368e) and an
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and single parents get an additional tax allowance of 1,308e (see §24b GTC). Similar
to the unemployment scale, these amounts should guarantee the material needs of the
households (seeDeutscher Bundestag, 2011). Following this interpretation one can
derive an implicit scale that refers to the bottom tail of the distribution, likewise as
the unemployment scale (see third column of Table 5.5).41 Furthermore, it is possible
to derive a scale which pertains to the whole income distribution. Here we follow
the procedure of Bönke and Eichfelder (2010) and attain an income dependent
equivalence scale corresponding to Equation 5.4. The deductions Ω(zi) displayed in
the fourth column of Table 5.5 represent the additional amount of income required
to achieve the same standard of living as the reference household. The maximum
deflators (fifth column of Table 5.5) are calculated in order to account for the fact
that deriving equivalence scales for low market incomes yields to negative equivalent
incomes. Hence, a minimum disposable income, which equales to the subsistence level
of a single household, is assumed. In our case it corresponds to 7,728e.42
Referring to the equity perceptions inherent in the German support legislation we
derive maximum deflators which relate to both scenarios under investigation, the case
of ‘child support only’ and the case of joint ‘child and spousal support’ (see the two
last columns of Table 5.5). However, in the latter case we abstain from deriving a scale
for varying income levels of the custodial parent. This approach would presuppose too
many assumptions and universally valid results could not be inferred. Hence, we only
take into account the minimal requirements of the household of the custodial parent,
expressed as UEB II.43 We relate these to the mininal requirements of the non-custodial
parent, stated by the Düsseldorfer Table. In the case of ‘child support only’ we oppose
the minimal child requirements as stated in the Düsseldorfer Table plus half the child
allowance to the minimal requirements of the non-custodial parent.
Table 5.5 provides an overview of the scales inherent in single subsystems of the
German tax-benefit system. It can be inferred that the equity perceptions implied in
political regulations, in parts, differ considerably. Taking a closer look at both the
scales independent of base reveals two particularities: First, in both cases the effect
of an additional child on the scale/deflator is not constant. In the case of the tax
scale we observe a relatively high effect to the first child and lower but constant effects
between the first and second as well as between the second and third child. This
allowance for childcare and education (2,640e).
41The difference between the above derived unemployment scale and the stated income independent
tax scale consists in an additional consideration of supplemental social requirements as e.g. expen-
diture on health and nursing insurance etc. (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2011).
42The calculation of the maximum deflators complies with m(µh, zh) = µhµh−Ω(zh) with µh − Ω(zh) =
µminr = 7,728e (see Bönke and Eichfelder, 2010, p. 302, fn. 7).
43We refer to the UEB II as derived in Section 5.3.3, Table C.6, column seven in Appendix C instead
of referring to the above mentioned subsistence level. We decide for this procedure, aiming at
discrimination between pure legislation (subsistence level) and the application of government rules
(applied UEB II rates, implementation of support regulation).
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irregularity can be deduced from the additional tax allowance for single-parents. In
the case of the unemployment scale we observe a relatively low but constant effect
to the first and between the second and third child and a higher effect between the
first and second child. This observation is mainly driven by the rise of supplemental
payments between the first and second child in single-parent families (see Appendix C,
Table C.7 forth column). Second, the deflators deduced from the tax system are higher
than those of the unemployment scale. These relatively higher requirements stated by
the tax system can be attributed to two facts. As mentioned above, within the tax
system single-parents receive an additional tax allowance, so that we can observe a
relatively high effect to the first child. Additionally, the tax scale gives higher minimal
requirements to further children, this is due to the additional allowance for childcare
and education of the children.
Likewise, we find differences in the maximum deflators. However, as the stated
maximum deflators refer to different reference points, they cannot be compared directly.
The maximum deflators of the tax scale relate to the subsistence level of a single
household. The maximum deflators of the support scale, displayed in the second last
column of Table 5.5, refer to the following scenario: The non-custodial parent is liable
for child and spousal support. The household of the custodial parent draws UEB II
and the non-custodial parent remains an income of the minimal requirements stated
by the Düsseldorfer Table (last column of Table 5.4). Stated figures can be interpreted
as follows: The UEB II of the household of a custodial parent who lives with one child
exceeds the minimal requirements of the non-custodial parent by 6.1%. In case the
custodial parent lives with three dependent children, the UEB II exceeds the minimal
requirements of the non-custodial parent by 79.4%.
A similar interpretation holds for the last column of Table 5.5. These figures refer
to the following scenario: The non-custodial parent is only liable for child support
and the children as well as the non-custodial parent receive an income that equals
the minimal requirements stated by the Düsseldorfer Table. Hence, the children draw
support payments stated by the Düsseldorfer Table and the child allowance. The non-
custodial parent receives an income stated by the last column of Table 5.4. The figures
of Table 5.5 indicate that each child has approximately half the requirements of the
non-custodial parent.
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5.4.2 Distributive Justice in the Interplay of the Tax-Benefit
System
This subsection presents the results on equity perceptions inherent in the interplay of
the comprehensive German tax-benefit system. Results are presented on the basis of the
visualized implicit equivalence scales. Therefore, we exhibit seven Figures (5.2 to 5.8),
each composed of two subfigures (a) and (b). Any of the figures refers to a different
annual pre-tax-pre-transfer income of the custodial parent. Both the corresponding
subfigures display our two scenarios under investigation, (a) refers to the case of ‘child
support only’ and (b) to ‘child and spousal support’. The three graphs in each subfigure
represent the scales for the different household types of the custodial parent, the solid
line relates to AC (one adult, one child), the dashed line to ACC (one adult, two
children) and the doted line to ACCC (one adult, three children). With increasing
gross income of the custodial parent, scales display shorter path lengths. This rests
upon the assumption that the custodial parent draws an pre-tax-pre-transfer income
at least as high as that of the non-custodial parent (see Section 5.3.1). We decided for
this presentation with graphs becoming shorter, in order to prevent visual distortions.
For all the figures, scales and intervals of the axes kept relatively constant.
We refer to the scales related to ‘child support only’ at first. For constellations of
low income of both households (see first observations points of Figures 5.2 and 5.3)
we observe scales that rank approximately at the level of the unemployment scale (see
Section 5.4.1). Hence, the associated scale level is all the higher, the higher the number
of children. Referring to subsequent curve behaviour, scales decrease with an increase
in gross income of the non-custodial parent. Thereby we observe that the scales start
decreasing all the sooner the less children live in the household of the custodial parent.
The above mentioned observation that the scales exhibit all the higher values the
more children live in the household of the custodial parent, holds independently of the
income level of the custodial parent. A distinction that is associated with an increase of
the income of the custodial parent relates to higher scale levels for given incomes of the
non-custodial parent. As an example, assume an annual pre-tax-pre-transfer-income of
115,000e of the non-custodial parent, in the case the custodial parent draws UEB II
(Figure 5.2) scales rank between 0.22 (AC) and 0.41 (ACCC). In comparison, in case
the custodial parent draws an annual pre-tax-pre-transfer income of 93,600e (Figure
5.8) scales rank between 0.96 (AC) and 1.30 (ACCC).
The explanations for the characteristics of the displayed curve behaviour are straight-
forward. For low income levels of both parents, scales remain at a high and relative
constant level. On the one side, the non-custodial parent is not equipped with sufficient
income to meet his support obligations in its entirety. On the other side, the custodial
parent qualifies for UEB II. Since support claims are allowable on UEB II (§11 GTC),
disposable income neither for the custodial nor the non-custodial parent changes con-
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siderably. A closer look into the data reveals that the subsequent sharp decline in
the scales is triggered by those incomes, the non-custodial parent starts meeting his
obligations in its entirety. This suggests that in the following the increase in income
dominates the stated support payments.
A comparison of Figure 5.2 with Figure 5.3 reveals a further legal regulation. In
both figures the custodial parent qualifies for UEB II. However, in Figure 5.3 the
custodial parent is in minor employment, thus draws income form employment. It can
be observed that the scales of Figure 5.3 exceed those of the case in which the custodial
parent is unemployed. This phenomenon can be ascribed to §11b GSC II, which allows
unemployed persons to earn some extra money.
Comparisons between the two scenarios (a) and (b) within the same figure reveal,
independently of the income level of the custodial parent, similarities for the first
observation points and substantial difference for higher incomes of the non-custodial
parent. Only in the case the custodial parent is unemployed (Figure 5.2) the subfigures
(a) and (b) closely resemble each other with respect to the whole curve behaviour. In
this case, scales start at similar levels and decrease with an increase in income of the
non-custodial parent. Nevertheless, the decrease proceeds less rapidly in the case of
‘child and spousal support’ and additionally, scales level out at higher levels. As already
mentioned above, scale values of the first observation points of subfigures (a) and (b)
resemble each other for all further income levels of the custodial parent. However,
subsequent paths differ considerably.
For relatively low income levels of the custodial parent (see e.g. Figures 5.3 (b)
and 5.4 (b)) the scales experience an intense decline. This decline samples out all the
stronger, the higher the number of children in the household of the custodial parent.
As a consequence, we observe that at first, the scale of ACC falls below the scale of AC
and later, ACCC falls below AC and ACC. Thereby, those households of the custodial
parent with a high number of children have – in absolute terms – less income at
disposal than single-parent household with fewer children. For the cases of a custodial
parent with middle and high pre-tax-pre-transfer incomes (see exemplarily Figures 5.6
(b) – 5.8 (b)) scales do not change order anymore. Instead, one can observe three
characteristics worth mentioning. First, in case both households draw an identical
gross income (first observation point), the scales still fall apart. Second, the lower
the income level of the household of the custodial parent, the closer the scales rank
together. And third, scales experience a slight increase with an increase in income of
the non-custodial parent. Independently of the income level of the custodial parent,
scales level out between 1.1 and 1.3. For low income levels of the custodial parent
AC ends up over ACC and ACC and vice versa for high income levels of the custodial
parent.
The explanation for the fact that scale paths resample each other with respect to
the first observation points has to be twofold: The first answer refers to the those
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observations mirroring combinations of low incomes of both parents (see Figures 5.2
– 5.4). In these cases we can point to the explanation given above with respect to
the scenario of child support only. The disposable income neither of the non-custodial
parent nor of the custodial parent changes considerably, since support payments are
not allowable on UEB II for the custodial parent and payment obligations are low for
the non-custodial parent. Hence, the scales proceed relatively constant.
For cases of a custodial parent with middle and high pre-tax-pre-transfer income,
the first observations points also resemble those of the case ‘child support only’, as those
first observation points display income combinations with identical pre-tax-pre-transfer
incomes of the parents. Child support is independent of the difference in income and
has to be paid at those points. By contrast, spousal support is omitted. Hence, scales
fall apart for the different household-types and look like those of scenario (a).
The observation that scales change order is an interesting finding, which unveils that
spousal obligations exceed child obligations under certain assumptions. This applies all
the more, the wider apart falls the income of the non-custodial parent from that of the
custodial parent. As an example, is the non-custodial parent only liable for support for
one child and his former spouse, total child support adds up to a relatively low amount.
After deducting this amount from disposable income of the non-custodial parent, the
difference between the disposable incomes of both parents remains relatively high, so
that spousal support adds up to a relatively elevated amount. In comparison, in the case
the non-custodial parent is liable for more children, the difference between the income
of the parents is smaller. As a consequence, spousal support is smaller as well. We see
our conjecture, that spousal obligations exceed child support obligations, supported by
the observation that, with an increase in the income level of the custodial parent, the
change ceases and the scales rank together less closely. Furthermore, a closer look into
the data confirms this conjecture, since spousal support indeed exceeds child support
for high differences in the income of both parents.
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Figure 5.2: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws UEB II
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Figure 5.3: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 9,600e
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Figure 5.4: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 21,600e
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Figure 5.5: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 39,600e
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Figure 5.6: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 57,600e
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Figure 5.7: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 75,600e
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Figure 5.8: Implicit Equivalence Scale: CP draws an annual gross income of 93,600e
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5.4.3 Comparison of Implicit and Commonly Applied Scales
With a comparative look at the scales, it becomes apparent that the scales inherent
in the comprehensive tax-benefit system are dependent on income. Equity perceptions
associated with such a legislation imply, that with an increase in pre-tax-pre-transfer
income of the reference household (NCP), the difference in disposable income between
the non-custodial and the custodial parent has to decrease. Hence, actual scale be-
haviour is most likely be mirrored by the estimated KSS scale and, in terms of the
implicit single scales, by the tax and support scales. Concerning the absolute level
the KSS scale and the support scale exhibit similarities to reality in particular. The
stated maximum deflators of the support scale (see Table 5.5) refer to the scenario, in
which the custodial parent is unemployed. Hence, the scenario conforms to Figure 5.2.
Although the actual scale levels slightly exceed those of the support scale, in total we
detect a rather good fit (AC: 1.147 to 1.061; ACC: 1.599 to 1.479; ACCC: 1.939 to
1.794).44
A comparative look at Figures 5.2 and 5.3 reveals a further similarity between
the actual scales and the KSS scales. It becomes obvious, that in common with the
survey results of Koulovatianos et al. (2009) the German tax-benefit system also
compensates the actors for the loss of household production and the harm associated
with employment. Those scales, which relate to a custodial parent in minor employment
display higher values than the scales, which refer to an unemployed custodial parent.
The maximum deflators of the actual scales in comparison to the KSS scales exhibit the
following values: First, we refer to the case in which the custodial parent is not working,
AC: 1.147 to 0.888; ACC: 1.599 to 1.188; ACCC: 1.939 to 1.465. Second, we refer to the
case in which the custodial parent is in minor employment, AC: 1.394 to 1.359; ACC:
1.846 to 1.659; ACCC: 2.186 to 1.947. Thereby, it has to be kept in mind that the stated
values of the KSS scales refer to an annual gross income of approximately 16,600e (see
Section 5.2.3), whereas the actual scales refer to 15,600e. Hence, inferable differences
are slightly undervalued. But independently on this, the figures show, that the German
tax-benefit system compensates for employment, although less than deducted from the
KSS scales.
A further interesting finding also refers to the KSS scale. Therefore, we contrast
the ends of the scale paths of the KSS scales (see Figure 5.1) with those of the scenario
(b) of Figures 5.2 – 5.8. For the case the custodial parent is unemployed as well as
for the cases the custodial parent draws a relatively high income we find, that with
an increase in the gross income of the non-custodial parent the scales converge to
similar values. This observation holds separately for the cases the custodial parent
draws UEB II (Actual: 0.84–1.05 / KSS: 0.87–0.98) and the custodial parent is in
44The first figure refers to the actual scale, the second to the support scale. This ranking, actual scale
at first, referred scale afterwards, will be maintained also for the subsequent presentations.
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employment (Actual: 1.19–1.27 / KSS: 1.07–1.12).
Concerning the income independent scales, we find that both the implicit scales,
which are derived from the single subsystems, exhibit the highest scale values. Their
values exceed those of the implicit comprehensive scales as well as those of the com-
monly used expert scales (see Table 5.3). Therefore, we restrict further comparative
investigation only to the three expert based scales. We only apply them to the first
observation points of Figures 5.2 and 5.3, since these points mirror subsistence min-
imums, for which expert scales are mostly designed for (see Section 5.2.2). The old-
OECD scales exceed actual scales, by contrast, both further expert scales fit rather
well to the derived equity perceptions at the bottom tail of the income distribution.
Whereas the Citro scales almost coincide with the case the custodial parent is in
minor employment (AC: 1.394 to 1.45; ACC: 1.846 to 1.85; ACCC: 2.186 to 2.21), the
modified-OECD scales echo those of the case of an unemployed custodial parent (AC:
1.147 to 1.30; ACC: 1.599 to 1.60; ACCC: 1.939 to 1.90).
Finally, we want to point to a peculiarity of the comprehensive implicit scale that
stands out against all further mentioned scales. This observation refers only to high
income differences between the custodial and the non-custodial parent. And addition-
ally, refers only to the scenario (b) joint ‘child and spousal support’. We reveal equity
perceptions, which aim to issue households of the custodial parent with fewer children
with – in absolute terms – higher disposable incomes than households of custodial par-
ents with more children. Hence, for this special case, implicit scales change ranking
(AC scale > ACC scale > ACCC scale). None of the alternatively mentioned scales
display such behaviour.
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5.5 Results: Standard of Living Equalizing Support
Payments
This section presents the results to the question to what extent the actual support
payments mirror those payments that alternative equivalence scales would predict. The
section is based on the simulation model presented in Section 5.3. We calculate the
actual support payments, corresponding to the different scenarios under investigation.
In order to approximate support payments alternative equivalence scales would predict,
we take the configuration of the German tax and public transfer system as given and
calculate the disposable incomes for both newly formed households. In a next step, the
sum of their incomes is reallocated according to the four equivalence scales amplified
in Section 5.2.3; those are the old-OECD, the modified-OECD, the Citro and the
KSS scale. Hence, we allocate to the households artificial disposable incomes which
guarantee for an identical standard of living. Finally, predicted support payments
are derived by the difference between actual and artificial disposable income of the
non-custodial parent and the custodial parent, respectively.
Since the KSS scale is income dependent, data preparation is more complex. Also
in this case, we determine the actual post-tax-post-public-transfer incomes for the
non-custodial parent and the custodial parent separately and sum them up, in a first
step. In order to reallocate the sum according to the KSS scale, further adjustments
have to be made. As explained in Section 5.2.3, we estimate the non-linear relationship
between the derived equivalence scales and disposable income on the basis of the survey
results (see Table 5.2). We do this separately for both the employment statuses of the
custodial parent. By means of these equivalent scales, we are able to determine for each
income of the custodial parent the corresponding income of the non-custodial parent.
The sum of disposable incomes equals the sum of the corresponding equivalence scale.
As an example, the custodial parent has a given income of 2,000e and the estimated
equivalence scale is 0.8. Thus, the non-custodial parent needs an equivalent income
of 1,600e. Their equivalent incomes sum up to 3,600e and this corresponds to an
equivalence scale of 1 + 0.8 = 1.8. In order to calculate the corresponding equivalence
scale for any sum of household incomes, we estimate the relationship by use of linear
regression. In total, we establish six different relationships, each household type of the
custodial parent exhibits its own, differentiated by employment status. On the basis
of the estimated scales, we are able to allocate the summed disposable income to both
households and obtain artificial disposable incomes.45
45As an example, assume the scenario that both parents are in employment and the actual post-
tax-post-public-transfer incomes sum up to 3,000e. The estimated corresponding equivalence scale
amounts to 2.14. In order to allocate equivalent incomes, a share of 46.7% (1/2.14 = 0.467), that
equals 1,401e, has to be attributed to the custodial and a share of 53,3% (1.14/2.14 = 0.533),
that equals 1,599e, to the non-custodial parent. Assuming the actual post-tax-post-public-transfer
income amounts to 1,890e, the KSS scale predicts a support payment of 291e (1,890e-1,599e).
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Results on the deviations of the actual support payment from the predicted pay-
ments, are visualized by means of seven Figures (5.9 to 5.15), each is composed of three
subfigures (a), (b) and (c). Any of the figures refers to a different annual pre-tax-pre-
transfer income of the custodial parent. The corresponding subfigures display different
custodial parent household types, formerly associated with the non-custodial parent;
(a) refers to AC, (b) to ACC and (c) to ACCC. Thereby an A indicates that there lives
one adult, the custodial partent in the household and the number of Cs points to the
number of children in the household. Any of the subfigures displays the actual as well as
the artificial payments as a function of pre-tax-pre-transfer income of the non-custodial
parent. Hence, the single subfigures comprise six graphs: Two for our scenarios under
investigation (‘child support only’ and ‘child and spousal support’), and additional four
relating to the employed equivalence scales (old-OECD, modified-OECD, Citro and
KSS).46
At first, we direct the attention to the expert scales. As to be expected, payments
predicted by the old-OECD scale exceed those of the other two expert scales. Whereas
in turn, the Citro payments exceed those of the modified-OECD. The old-OECD scale
involves the lowest economies of scale, thus, awards the highest artificial disposable
incomes to the household of the custodial parent. As a consequence, support payments
amount to the highest values.
Concerning the KSS scale, we observe lower payments than those predicted by the
expert scales. Whereas the vertical difference between the expert scales themselves
keeps relatively constant over all scenarios under investigation, the position of the KSS
scale, in relation to the expert scales, is dependent (a) on the household type of the
custodial parent and (b) on the income level of the non custodial parent. For a given
income level of the custodial parent, we observe, that the expert graphs exceed the
KKS graph the more, the higher the number of household members of the custodial
parent and the higher the income level of the non-custodial parent. The reasons for
this observation are twofold. First, the deflators of the old-OECD and the Citro scale
exceed the maximum deflators of the KSS scale (see Table 5.3). Hence, for a given
income of the custodial parent, the upward shift of the expert graphs associated with
a rise in household members is observed to be higher than that of the KSS graph. The
second reason is the income independency of the expert scales in comparison to the
KSS scales. A rise in income of the non-custodial parent affects a further decrease in
the KSS scale, whereas the expert scales keep constant. Thus, the expert scales predict
even higher payments. This relation holds all the more, the higher is the income level
of the non-custodial parent. As a consequence, graphs slightly diverge.
46Tables C.8–C.10 in Appendix C provide additional information on the results. The tables state for
different income combinations of the parents the corresponding actual payable support amounts. In
addition, predicted payments are displayed as percentage deviation from the amount, payable in the
scenario ‘child and spousal support’.
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As to be expected, the graphs for ‘child support only’ and ‘child and spousal sup-
port’ concur for low incomes of the non-custodial parent, or for small differences be-
tween the incomes of the custodial and non-custodial parent. This observation relates
to those cases, in which no spousal support has to be paid.47 For cases, in which the
non-custodial parent could not even meet the claims to child support, graphs exactly
lie on the top of each other. For cases, where the difference between the incomes of
the custodial and non-custodial parent is small, the graph for ‘child and spousal sup-
port’ lies below the graph for ‘child support only’. This observation can be ascribed
to Section A, Remark 1 Düsseldorfer Table, hence, is caused by the downgrading of
the non-custodial parent, in consequence of the increased number of entitled persons.48
Starting with the additional payment of spousal support, both graphs diverge with
an increase in the income of the non-custodial parent. Whereas we observe a slight
increase associated with the upgrading within the Düsseldorfer Table, for the graph
of ‘child support only’, the increase in ‘child and spousal support’ is greater and the
graphs display slopes similar to the predicted payments.
Having a comparative look at the payments, it becomes apparent that those pay-
ments referring to the scenario ‘child support only’ lie below the predicted payments
of the expert scales almost in each of the subfigures. Since the graphs of the KSS
payments likewise lie below those of the expert scales, but feature a greater slope,
the KSS payments intersect actual child support payments in most of the subfigures.
Relating this observation to the issue of distributive justice, we can conclude the fol-
lowing: When referring to the expert scales, the present German tax-benefit system
discriminates against the household of the custodial parent, which receives ‘child sup-
port only’. When referring to the KSS scale, the conclusion is more complex. The
present German tax-benefit system discriminates against the household of the custo-
dial parent especially in those cases, the non-custodial parent has payment liabilities
only against one child and the income of the custodial parent is relatively low. The
higher the number of children and the higher the income of the custodial parent, the
later the KSS graph intersects the graph of ‘child support only’. Even for very high
incomes of the custodial parent, the KSS graph lies – over the whole income interval –
below the graph of ‘child support only’. Hence, actual child support payments exceed
those recommended by the KSS scale (see e.g. Figure 5.15).
We now focus on the scenario of ‘child and spousal support’ in comparison to the
predicted payments.49 At first, we focus on the case of parents at the bottom tail of
the income distribution. This situation is displayed in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. In Figure
5.9 the custodial parent is unemployed and draws unemployment benefit II. The actual
payments concur with those predicted by the expert scales. Figure 5.10 displays a
47For reasons for the case that spousal support equals to zero see Section 5.3.4.
48For a more detailed explanation see Section 5.3.4.
49When referring to ‘actual’ support payments in the following, we consider the case of ‘child and
spousal support’.
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similar financial situation of the custodial parent, since it still qualifies for unemploy-
ment benefit II. However, the custodial parent is employed and has some additional
income at disposal (see §11b GTC). The comparative analysis shows two issues worth
mentioning. The expert payments experience an upward shift, caused by the elevated
sum of disposable household incomes. The actual payments experience a downward
shift, caused by the diminished difference between the incomes from employment from
the custodial and the non-custodial parent.50 As a consequence, in Figure 5.10 actual
payments fall below those suggested by the experts.51
The KSS scale relates rather different to the actual payments than the expert scales
in both the scenarios the custodial parent qualifies for unemployment benefit II. In the
‘pure’ unemployment benefit II case (see Figure 5.9), KSS payments are lower than the
actual payments. And when the custodial parent starts minor employment (see Figure
5.10), the payments recommended by the KSS scale rise, since the KSS scales account
for the employment status (see Section 5.2.3). This rise in KSS payments on the one
hand, and the above mentioned drop in actual payments on the other hand, cause a
concurrence of the actual with KSS payments for the case the custodial parent is in
minor employment. Hence, in case the custodial parent is unemployed, actual support
payments are mirrored quite well by those payments, predicted by the expert scales (the
old-OECD scale in particular). Nevertheless, this conclusion does not hold anymore, if
the custodial parent starts working. For this case, the KSS payments ensure a better
fit to actual payments.
Looking at the evolution of the payments associated with an increase in gross income
of the custodial parent reveals some further interesting findings. Expert scales result in
payments that always exceed actual payments, whereas the KSS payments recommend
payments lower than the actual ones. However, in some of the scenarios, the KSS scales
fit the actual payments rather well. This applies all the more, the higher the difference
in income between the custodial and the non-custodial parent and additionally, the less
household members are assigned to the custodial parent household.52
Conclusively, we find that the support payments, generated by the German tax-
benefit system, are not mirrored by a certain equivalence scales. Rather it depends on
four determinants how well the single scales fit the actual payments. The determinants
are (a) the number of children the non-custodial parent is liable for, (b) the income
level of the non-custodial parent, (c) the employment status and (d) the income level
of the custodial parent. In the case of an unemployed custodial parent all alternative
scales recommend lower than the actual payments. Thus, the scale with the lowest
50See Section B, Remark I.1.a) Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2011).
51As an example, see e.g. Table C.9 in Appendix C, the non-custodial parent is liable for a spouse
and two children. Assume the non-custodial parent draws a gross income of 6,300e. In case the
custodial parent is unemployed, spousal and child support amounts to 1,822e, this amount drops
to 1,075e the custodial parent starts minor employment.
52This relationship is an indicator for the income dependence of the KSS scale.
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economies of scale, the old-OECD scale, fits best. In case the custodial parent is in
employment and lives in a household with just one child, the KSS scale – on average
– displays actual payments most likely. In addition, the KSS scale fits best even for a
custodial parent with two and three children, albeit only for those cases the custodial
parent draws a low income.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the equity perceptions that are inherent in the German
tax-benefit system. Thereby we focus in particular on the support legislation, as we are
interested in those equity perceptions the increasing share of persons living in separated
family forms is confronted with. We generate an artificial dataset that comprises
various combinations of separately living families. That means, in each case of a
separated family we consider a single household of the non-custodial parent and an
associated single-parent household of the custodial parent, which comprises one to
three dependent children. Our analysis is done for varying annual gross incomes of
both households. The data runs through a simulation model comprising the German
tax-benefit system, which includes the German legislation on taxes, social security
contributions, unemployment benefits and support payments.
We analyze the equity perceptions by means of equivalence scales which are em-
ployed in two different applications. First, we reverse the commonly applied equiva-
lence scale methodology by assuming that horizontal equity is satisfied by the German
tax-benefit system. Hence, we investigate the equity perceptions by means of implicit
equivalence scales that are inherent in the interplay of the comprehensive tax-benefit
system. Finally, we contrast the implicit scales to equivalence scales discussed in the
literature. Second, we employ equivalence scales in order to provide distributive jus-
tice in a more ‘applied’ manner. We investigate to what extents the actual support
payments differ form those payments that would be ‘recommended’ by commonly used
equivalence scales.
Both applications of equivalence scales reveal that the equity perceptions that are
inherent in the German tax-benefit system are very complex. They cannot be speci-
fied by equivalent scales commonly discussed in the literature or used in distributional
analyses. Rather it depends on four determinants and the multitude of combination
possibilities of how well the single scales fit the implicit scales or actual payments. The
determinants are (a) the number of children the non-custodial parent is liable for, (b)
the income level of the non-custodial parent, (c) the employment status and (d) the
income level of the custodial parent. However, we find some generalities. We discover
for situations in which both households belong to the bottom tail of the income distri-
bution that the commonly used expert scales fit rather well actual equity perceptions.
Furthermore we find that an increase in income of the reference household – the non-
custodial parent – causes a decrease in the implicit scales. This observation indicates
that the scales inherent in the German tax-benefit system are dependent on income.
Out of the four employed scales only the KSS scale displays this feature. The survey
based KSS scale comprises a further feature which reflects the implicit scales rather
well. This refers to a dependence on the employment status of the concerned per-
sons. Both the KSS scale and the implicit scales compensate for the loss of household
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production and the harm associated with employment.
Hence, under two assumptions one could infer that in some features the legislature in
Germany reaches the preferences of the society rather well. First, we have to agree with
Atkinson (1995) in assuming that implicit equivalence scales mirror the population’s
preferences revealed through the electoral process. Second, we have to assume that the
KSS scale, which is based on a survey conducted in Germany, represents the preferences
of the Germany society well. However, the implicit scales display some properties that
should be reconsidered by the legislature. This includes for example the re-ranking of
scales in cases the custodial parent draws a relative low income and the non-custodial
parent is liable for child and spousal support.
Besides its contribution to the political debate on distributive justice, this study
contributes to the economic literature by applying the framework of implicit equivalence
scales to the context of support payments. Additionally, the study is engaged in the
discussion on an appropriate design of equivalence scales in order to reflect transfer
systems that are observed in practice. We find that actual scales are more complex than
those scales commonly used in distributional analyses. With respect to the actual scales
we observe an income dependence of the scales. Hence we agree with Muellbauer
and Ven (2002, 2004) that the assumption of base dependency may be necessary in
order to reflect actual transfer systems. Additionally, we point to the fact that in future
research on equivalence scales the employment status of persons should explicitly be
taken into account.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the literature and to the political debate on social policy in
Germany in different dimensions. From the content point of view the thesis is concerned
with the economic consequences of two current aspects of the changing structure of the
German society, the aging of society (Part I) and the shifting household composition
from ‘classic’ families to single parent households (Part II). The aim of the single
chapters is to give deeper insights into the structure of the German pension (Chapter
2–4) and support legislation (Chapter 5) in order to reveal possible weaknesses and to
allow for possible interventions. From a methodological point of view the investigations
are based on the analysis of survey and simulated data.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we analyze the evolution of the financial situation, the
changes in income composition and the evolution of income distribution of the elderly
on the basis of two different datasets. Whereas we employ the EVS in Chapter 2, we
employ the SOEP in Chapter 3. This procedure enables us to analyze a wide period,
reaching from the late 70s up to current years. Methodologically, both chapters are
similar. The elderly population, defined as people of age 55 and older, is decomposed
by people that resident in the Old and New Federal States. Furthermore, we distin-
guish non-pensioner and pensioner households. We use the Gini index as measure of
inequality since it is additively decomposable into single income components, and by
means of the Gini elasticity we are able to quantify the impact of changes of the relative
share of single income components on inequality.
For the whole period under observation we find an improvement of the financial
situation of the elderly. However, the increase in mean equivalent income was relatively
strong for the first years and diminished subsequently. Hence, for the last decade, our
results document stagnation, and for the pensioner households even a slightly worsening
of the financial situation. Referring to the subsamples we find higher mean equivalent
incomes for the non-pensioners than for the pensioners and the elderly in the Old
Laender exhibit higher incomes than their eastern counterparts. Inequality, measured
by the Gini index, remained almost constant for the pensioners as well as for the
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non-pensioners in the Old Laender over the whole observation period. Right after the
German reunification, when the subsamples of the New Laender entered the analysis,
inequality was significantly lower in the eastern than in the western part of Germany.
However, in the following years inequality increased in the New Laender; slightly for
the pensioner, sharply for the non-pensioner. The increase in case of the latter was so
sharp, that inequality almost converged for this subsample in both, the Old and New
Laender.
With respect to the political applicability the results on the Gini elasticities dis-
play interesting findings in particular: For all subsamples under investigation it turns
out, that an increase in the share of employment and capital income raises inequality,
whereas an increase in transfer and pension income reduces inequality. Considering
the reforms that have been undertaken in the last decade, like the rise in retirement
age (‘Rente mit 67’) and the simultaneously strengthening of self-reliance for old-age
provision (‘Riester-’ and ‘Rürup-Reform’), a twofold effect is to be expected. On the
one hand it refers to the income level and on the other hand to the income distribution
between the elderly in society. The reform ‘Rente mit 67’ is actually accompanied by a
reduction of the effective pension level. Referring to the Gini elasticities, the reduction
of the pension level is associated with a rise in inequality among the elderly. A similar
impact on inequality is to be expected by the strengthening of self-reliance for old-age
provision. The outstanding positive Gini elasticity of capital income for pensioner in
both parts of Germany and the simultaneously increase in the share of capital income
for some subsamples may foster inequality between the elderly.
In Chapter 4 this thesis seizes on the increasing importance of self-reliance for old-
age provision and examines whether the German market for private old-age provision
is organized efficiently. Thereby, the focus lies on market failure caused by adverse
selection in the private pension insurance market. Methodologically, we use the 2005
wave of the SAVE survey data and estimate a probit model of insurance holdings.
Referring to the research focus, subjective life-expectancy is the core determinant in
investigating the uptake of private old-age insurance. And indeed, we find that subjec-
tive life-expectancy is positively related with the probability of having supplementary
private pension insurance. This indicates that the German market for private pension
insurance is in fact characterized by adverse selection. Furthermore, the selected esti-
mation model allows us to examine further determinants for the uptake. Therewith,
the chapter contributes to the discussion on the low uptake of annuities, the so-called
‘annuity puzzle’. For Germany we find that pre-existing entitlements to benefits from
the public pension system tend to be a substitute to private insurance. Additionally,
financial literacy enhances the uptake of private pension insurance. We also find evi-
dence for a bequest motive in old-age provision, but we see no indication for pooling
longevity risk within couples.
From a policy point of view, Part I of this thesis refers to aspects in the matter of
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old-age security that may foster inequality between the elderly of the German society.
Private old-age provision seems to gain more and more importance for financial security
in old-age (see Chapter 2 and 3). However, the market for private pension insurance
is characterized by inefficiencies related to adverse selection. Hence, difficulties may
arise for low risk individuals for whom insurance in the private pension market is
prohibitively expensive (see Chapter 4). Policy makers may therefore keep in mind
that strengthening the role of private old-age provision is not without difficulty for
different parts of the society: Those parts that are not aware of the importance, those
who financially cannot take part and those for whom private old-age insurance seem
less attractive because of expensive premiums.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the equity perceptions that are inherent in the German
tax-benefit system. Thereby we specially focus is on the support legislation, as we
are interested in those equity perceptions the increasing share of persons living in
separated family forms is confronted with. We generate a synthetic dataset which only
comprises two kinds of households, single households and single-parent households with
one up to three dependent children. Single households represent households of the non-
custodial parent and single-parent households those of the custodial parent. The data
runs through a simulation model comprising the German tax-benefit system, which
includes the German legislation on taxes, social security contributions, unemployment
benefits and support payments. Methodologically, the analysis is based on the use of
equivalence scales. Those are applied in two different manners. First, we determine
the equivalence scales which are implicit in the German tax-benefit system. Second,
we compare actual support payments with those payments commonly used equivalence
scales would predict.
Chapter 5 contributes to a deeper understanding of redistribution within the Ger-
man tax-benefit system. When interpreting the government according to Atkinson
(1995), who points out that in democratic countries implicit equivalence scales are nor-
mally the result of the population’s preferences revealed through the electoral process,
the results could be used by the legislature in order to compare actual with desired
redistribution.
A comparison of the implicit scales with equivalence scales that are discussed in
economic literature unveils some interesting findings: Those implicit equivalence scales
referring to situations in which both households belong to the bottom tail of the income
distribution fit rather well with the commonly used expert scales. Furthermore, we
find that an increase in income of the reference household – the non-custodial parent
– causes a decrease in the implicit scales. This observation indicates that the scales
inherent in the German tax-benefit system are dependent on income. Out of the four
employed scales only the KSS scale displays this feature. The survey based KSS scale
comprises a further feature which reflects the implicit scales rather well. This refers to
a dependence on the employment status of the concerned persons. Both the KSS scale
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and the implicit scales compensate for the loss of household production and the harm
associated with employment.
Hence, under two assumptions one could infer that in some features the legislature in
Germany reaches the preferences of the society rather well. First, we have to agree with
Atkinson (1995) in assuming that implicit equivalence scales mirror the population’s
preferences revealed through the electoral process. Second, we have to assume that the
KSS scale, which is based on a survey conducted in Germany, represents the preferences
of the Germany society well. However, the implicit scales display some properties that
should be reconsidered by the legislature. This includes for example the re-ranking of
scales in cases the custodial parent draws a relative low income and the non-custodial
parent is liable for child and spousal support.
Besides the political applicability, Chapter 5 contributes to the economic literature
on equivalence scales. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
which introduces the methodology of implicit equivalence scales in order to reveal
equity perceptions that are inherent in the support legislation. Second, the chapter
contributes to the discussion on an appropriate configuration of equivalence scales in
order to reflect transfer systems that are observed in practice. We find that actual
scales are more complex than those scales commonly used in distributional analyses.
With respect to the actual scales we observe an income dependence of the scales.
Hence we agree withMuellbauer and Ven (2002, 2004) that the assumption of base
dependency may be necessary in order to reflect actual transfer systems. Additionally
we point to the fact that in future research on equivalence scales the employment status
of persons should explicitly be taken into account.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Income Concept: pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent in-
come
Definition
The income concept used throughout Chapter 2 is the pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent
income in year 2003 prices. For years 1978 to 1998, incomes have been adjusted by
consumer price indices, reported in Table A.1, provided in German Federal Statis-
tical Office (2009). Pre-tax-post-transfer equivalent income comprises five income
components: (a) employment income: earned income and self-employed income; (b)
retirement income: retirement pensions from public pension fund, civil servant’s pen-
sions, company pensions, and other pensions; (c) transfer income: benefits related to
former employment, social assistance, family-related benefits, and other transfers; (d)
investment income; (e)other income: which is a residual component that cannot un-
ambiguously be assigned to the previous five income concepts. For each cross-section,
each income component has been constructed from several EVS variables. Table A.2
summarizes the EVS variables pertaining to each income source. Pre-tax-post-transfer
income is the sum of all individual incomes of elderly persons living in a household unit
plus a fraction of incomes reported at the household level only, with individual incomes
of other household members being ignored. To derive equivalent pre-tax-post-transfer
income, we apply the OECD-modified equivalence scale.
Interpretation
The number of elderly persons in a household unit not necessarily complies with the
household size of the original EVS household units. Particularly, in our sample all
non-elderly persons and their individual incomes have been discarded from our sample.
As a result, we might underestimate the true level of household-size economies and the
access of elderly people to financial resources. For example, elderly living with younger
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Table A.1: Consumer price indices for Germany
Year OL NL
1978 54.36 –
1983 68.92 –
1988 73.05 –
1993 86.08 85.09
1998 93.54 94.62
2003 100.00 100.00
Source: Own calculations from data of German
Federal Statistical Office (2009).
high income recipients may benefit from intra-household income pooling. In this sense,
our income concept is a lower bound for their ‘true’ level of material comfort. A benefit
of our income definition is that it ‘controls’ for changes in household arrangements or
changes in non elderly household members’ incomes. One might also argue that a pre-
tax-post-transfer income concept is a biased estimate of peoples ‘true’ living standards,
as consumption ultimately depends on post-tax-post-transfer income. Yet, observations
in our database usually cannot be treated as tax units, and computing post-tax-post-
transfer income (especially for different income sources) would urge us to make strong
assumptions on individual tax liabilities. Finally, pre-tax-post-transfer income is less
sensitive to changes in the tax code, and thus might be a better indicator for assessing
the impacts of previous pension reforms on the financial situation of the elderly.
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Reforms
Table A.3: Main pension reforms in the period 1978–2003
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Research Sample and Adjustment of EVS Sampling
Weights
The database underlying our calculations is a subset of the EVS waves 1978–2003. The
non-weighted number of household units in this subset is 103,205. One problem with
the EVS database is the fact that it oversamples people in their 70s on the account
of the cohort age 80 and older. To fit the German microcensus statistics, we have
adjusted EVS sample weights according to the entropy based minimum information loss
principle. The minimum information loss principle satisfies a positivity constraint on
the sampling weights to be computed. The software we have made use of is Adjust (see
Merz, 1994, for further information), it incorporates a numerical solution by means
of a modified Newton-Raphson procedure with a global exponential approximation.
Official statistics on the absolute numbers of persons in Germany by age and year
have been taken from the online database of the German Ferderal Statistical Office
downloadable from http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/.
Results From the Stratified Bootstrap Approach
Tables A.4 to A.9 correspond with Tables 2.2–2.7 in Chapter 2.
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Table A.9: Gini elasticities in year 2003 (stratified bootstrap)
OL NL
Pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.0728* 0.1480*
(95% CI) (0.0639; 0.0821) (0.1172; 0.1775)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.1923* -0.3361*
(95% CI) (-0.2054; -0.1797) (-0.3712; -0.2981)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0114* 0.0062
(95% CI) (-0.0146; -0.0078) (-0.0163; 0.0300)
Investments
ηˆ4 0.0662* 0.1025*
(95% CI) (0.0555; 0.0785) (0.0833; 0.1137)
Other
ηˆ5 0.0646* 0.0794*
(95% CI) (0.0561; 0.0759) (0.0562; 0.1042)
Non-pensioners
Employment
ηˆ1 0.1213* 0.2292*
(95% CI) (0.1035; 0.1380) (0.1782; 0.3036)
Retirement
ηˆ2 -0.0345* 0.0034
(95% CI) (-0.0488; -0.0196) (-0.0163; 0.0226)
Transfers
ηˆ3 -0.0956* -0.2751*
(95% CI) (-0.1047; -0.0854) (-0.3112; -0.2371)
Investments
ηˆ4 -0.0185* -0.0088
(95% CI) (-0.0271; -0.0098) (-0.0223; 0.0100)
Other
ηˆ5 0.0272* 0.0514*
(95% CI) (0.0159; 0.0360) (0.0181; 0.0687)
Note: ηˆi denotes the observed Gini elasticity of income component i. CI denotes Hall’s
confidence interval. *Elasticity is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Source: German Sample Survey of Income and Expenditures (2003).
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Table B.1: Derived variables and their underlying original variables
Derived Variable Original Variables
PPI f72m_4_imp
AVSLE f06s_imp; f10s_imp; f90o1_imp; f90o2_imp; f91o1_imp;
f91o2_imp; f91s_imp; f92o1_imp; f92o2_imp; f92s_imp
RISKAVERSE f59a4_imp; f59a5_imp; f59a6_imp
IMPATIENT f59c1_imp; f59c2_imp; f59c3_imp
FINLIT f73eo6_imp; f73eo11_imp
CIVSERV f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
WORKER f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
SELFEMPL f24s1_imp; f24s2_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
NETWEALTHEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f68o_imp; f70o_imp; f73eo1_imp;
f73eo2_imp; f73eo3_imp; f73eo5_imp; f73eo6_imp;
f73eo11_imp; f78o1_imp; f78o2_imp; f78o3_imp;
f78o4_imp; f78o5_imp; f82o_imp; f84o_imp
OTHINSEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f73eo9_imp; f73eo10_imp
AVAGE f07o_imp; f10s_imp; f11o_imp; year
AVAGESQ f07o_imp; f10s_imp; f11o_imp; year
NRCHILD f13o_imp
MARRIED f09s_imp
PARTNER f10s_imp
NETINCEQ f14o_imp; f18o_imp; f54o1_imp; f54o2_imp
EAST bula
Source: The German SAVE Study (2005).
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Table B.2: Fraction of imputed observations per underlying variable in estimation
sample
Variable Fraction of imputed observations
f06s_ind 0.00
f07o_ind 0.02
f09s_ind 0.00
f10s_ind 0.00
f11o_ind 0.00
f13o_ind 0.01
f14o_ind 0.00
f18o_ind 0.01
f24s1_ind 0.03
f24s2_ind 0.02
f54o1_ind 0.15
f54o2_ind 0.13
f59a4_ind 0.04
f59a5_ind 0.04
f59a6_ind 0.04
f59c1_ind 0.01
f59c2_ind 0.02
f59c3_ind 0.03
f68o_ind 0.03
f70o_ind 0.03
f72m_4_ind 0.00
f73eo1_ind 0.14
f73eo2_ind 0.12
f73eo3_ind 0.15
f73eo5_ind 0.04
f73eo6_ind 0.09
f73eo9_ind 0.13
f73eo10_ind 0.08
f73eo11_ind 0.03
f78o1_ind 0.02
f78o2_ind 0.04
f78o3_ind 0.04
f78o4_ind 0.04
f78o5_ind 0.03
f82o_ind 0.02
f84o_ind 0.02
f90o1_ind 0.02
f90o2_ind 0.03
f91o1_ind 0.03
f91o2_ind 0.03
f91s_ind 0.02
f92o1_ind 0.03
f92o2_ind 0.03
f92s_ind 0.02
N 1320
Note: N is sample size (non-retired housholds).
Source: The German SAVE Study (2005). Own calculations.
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Table B.3: Model summaries of probit estimations of the model without and with six
different vectors of control variables for the five imputed datasets
Dataset
1 2 3 4 5
Without control Number of iterations: 3variables
LR chi2(3) 12.89 12.98 12.7 13.65 13.01
Prob > chi2 0.0049 0.0047 0.0053 0.0034 0.0046
Pseudo R2 0.0113 0.0113 0.0111 0.0119 0.0114
Log likelihood -565.2214 -565.1770 -565.3164 -564.8397 -565.1577
With control Number of iterations: 4variables
(1)
LR chi2(15) 108.60 105.78 106.15 107.08 106.49
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0950 0.0925 0.0928 0.0937 0.0931
Log likelihood -517.3654 -518.7747 -518.5897 -518.1235 -518.4185
(2)
LR chi2(15) 106.91 103.98 104.14 105.09 104.56
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0935 0.0909 0.0911 0.0919 0.0915
Log likelihood -518.209 -519.677 -519.593 -519.117 -519.385
(3)
LR chi2(15) 108.71 105.93 106.26 107.33 106.59
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0951 0.0926 0.0929 0.0939 0.0932
Log likelihood -517.309 -518.701 -518.536 -517.999 -518.37
(4)
LR chi2(15) 107.06 104.15 104.28 105.38 104.68
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0936 0.0911 0.0912 0.0922 0.0916
Log likelihood -518.135 -519.589 -519.526 -518.973 -519.324
(5)
LR chi2(15) 108.11 105.26 105.59 106.48 105.96
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0946 0.0921 0.0924 0.0931 0.0927
Log likelihood -517.608 -519.033 -518.868 -518.426 -518.682
(6)
LR chi2(14) 100.55 94.96 94.96 98.02 95.96
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0879 0.0831 0.0831 0.0857 0.0839
Log likelihood -521.391 -524.184 -524.187 -522.652 -523.686
Source: The German SAVE Study (2005). Own calculations.
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Table C.1: Blanket allowances (2011)
Kind of Allowance Tax Deductible Value Entitled Persons
Work Related Standard 920ea Each EmployeeTax Deduction
Blanket Allowance for 36eb Each EmployeeSpecial Expenses
Provisional Lump Sum variablec,d Each Employee
Single-Parent Lump Sum 1,308ee Single parent
Tax Exemption for 7,008ef If no Child AllowanceDependent Children
Source: a§9a sent. 1 no. 1a GTC; b§10c sent. 1 GTC; c§39a subp. 2 sent. 5 no. 3 GTC;
ddepends on social security contributions, for details see Table C.5; e§24b GTC;
f§32 subp. 2 GTC.
Table C.2: Determinants to calculate provisional lump sum (2011)
Lum Sum as to Tax Deductible Value
SPI 44% of Employee’s Contribution to SPI
SHI & SNI
Standard Employee’s Contribution to SHI and SNI
Minimum 12% of Gross Income
Maximum 1,900e
Note: SPI (Statutory pension insurance); SHI (Statutory health insurance);
SNI (Statutory nursing insurance).
Source: §39b subp. 2 sent. 5 no. 3 GTC.
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Table C.3: Income tax rate (2011)
Taxable Income Income Tax
1. to 8,004e 0
2. 8,005e to 13,469e (912.17 · y + 1, 400) · y
3. 13,470e to 52,881e (228.74 · z + 2, 397) · z + 1, 038
4. 52,882e to 250,730e 0.42 · x− 8, 172
5. starting 250,731e 0.45 · x− 15, 694.
Note: y equals the thousandth part of taxable income exceeding 8,005e;
z equals the thousandth part of taxable income exceeding 13,470e;
x equals taxable income.
Source: §32a GTC.
Table C.4: Determinants to calculate supplementary taxes (2011)
Solidarity Surcharge
Assessment Basis Income Taxa
Exemption Limitb 972,00e
Transition Sectionb,c 972,01e–1340,68e
Complete Assessmentb 1340,69e
Note: aSubject to tax exemption for dependent children;
brelated to the assessment basis; c Solitarity sur-
charge does not exceed 20% of the difference bet-
ween the assessment basis and the exemption limit.
Source: §3 subp. 1 Solitary Surcharge Law (SSL).
Table C.5: Determinants to calculate social security contributions (2011)
SPI PUI SHI SNI
Contribution Assessment Basis Gross Income
Contribution Assessment Ceiling 66,000ea 66,000ea 44,500eb 44,500eb
Employee’s Contribution 9.95% 1.5% 8.2% 0.975%
Note: SPI (Statutory pension insurance); PUI (Public unemplyment insurance);
SHI (Statutory health insurance); SNI (Statutory nursing insurance).
Source: a§§161–167 GSC VI, b§6 subp. 6 GSC V.
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Table C.8: Actual and predicted support payments to AC
Gross income AC
Actual paymentsa Predicted paymentsb
CP NCP Child Ch. & Spous. old modified Citro KSSSupport Support OECD OECD
UEBII 2,300 291 377 9 -15 3 -80
4,300 345 1,191 -19 -29 -22 -58
6,300 404 1,639 -5 -15 -8 -41
8,300 491 2,167 2 -7 0 -32
800 2,300 291 272 23 -12 15 -20
4,300 345 632 40 20 35 11
6,300 404 1,080 36 22 33 12
8,300 491 1,608 33 21 30 10
1,800 2,300 291 272 13 -23 5 -32
4,300 345 683 26 7 21 -2
6,300 404 1,130 28 14 25 4
8,300 491 1,658 28 15 25 5
3,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 345 383 51 11 42 -13
6,300 404 830 41 18 35 0
8,300 491 1,358 35 18 31 1
4,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 404 537 66 27 57 -10
8,300 491 1,065 47 23 41 -4
6,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 404 374 58 -5 43 -75
8,300 491 741 70 33 61 -16
7,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 – – – – – –
8,300 491 462 100 34 85 -62
Note: avalues stated in e,bfigures denote the deviation to ‘Child and Spousal Support’ in percent.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table C.9: Actual and predicted support payments to ACC
Gross income ACC
Actual paymentsa Predicted paymentsb
CP NCP Child Ch. & Spous. old modified Citro KSSSupport Support OECD OECD
UEBII 2,300 477 477 -9 -41 -20 -103
4,300 654 1,299 -19 -35 -25 -66
6,300 748 1,822 -7 -20 -11 -51
8,300 924 2,400 2 -11 -3 -41
800 2,300 477 477 -22 -56 -34 -75
4,300 654 618 59 25 47 -1
6,300 748 1,075 53 28 44 5
8,300 924 1,653 44 25 37 2
1,800 2,300 477 477 100 84 94 -83
4,300 654 618 153 134 147 -7
6,300 748 1,042 113 97 107 4
8,300 924 1,620 83 69 78 1
3,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 654 618 32 -7 18 -40
6,300 748 1,012 45 17 35 -14
8,300 924 1,590 39 17 31 -11
4,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 748 718 73 28 57 -28
8,300 924 1,296 53 24 43 -19
6,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 748 690 43 -9 25 -82
8,300 924 972 78 35 63 -34
7,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 – – – – – –
8,300 924 866 68 14 49 -79
Note: avalues stated in e,bfigures denote the deviation to ‘Child and Spousal Support’ in percent.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table C.10: Actual and predicted support payments to ACCC
Gross income ACCC
Actual paymentsa Predicted paymentsb
CP NCP Child Ch. & Spous. old modified Citro KSSSupport Support OECD OECD
UEBII 2,300 477 477 1 -40 -17 -115
4,300 924 1,305 -12 -32 -21 -70
6,300 1,032 1,990 -7 -23 -14 -57
8,300 1,296 2,599 2 -13 -5 -48
800 2,300 477 477 -11 -54 -30 -89
4,300 924 870 25 -5 12 -36
6,300 1,032 1,101 63 34 50 -3
8,300 1,296 1,710 51 29 41 -6
1,800 2,300 477 477 114 96 106 -96
4,300 924 870 93 77 86 -40
6,300 1,032 1,068 123 105 115 -4
8,300 1,296 1,677 90 74 83 -6
3,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 924 870 13 -19 -1 -56
6,300 1,032 1,183 43 14 30 -25
8,300 1,296 1,793 39 16 29 -21
4,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 1,032 978 52 13 35 -46
8,300 1,296 1,492 53 23 40 -30
6,300 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 1,032 978 30 -14 11 -87
8,300 1,296 1,209 71 30 53 -48
7,800 2,300 – – – – – –
4,300 – – – – – –
6,300 – – – – – –
8,300 1,296 1,209 51 6 31 -87
Note: avalues stated in e,bfigures denote the deviation to ‘Child and Spousal Support’ in percent.
Source: Own calculations.
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